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Abstract
This Report represents the culmination of a year-long project undertaken by the Crowley Program to update the study of the use and impact of the Internal Security Act (ISA) in Malaysia
in light of international law obligations. We reference first those international commitments that
Malaysia has expressly adopted. However, these are very few–reflecting the antipathy felt by the
Malaysian government for international obligations of this sort. Additionally, we have made reference to the generally-accepted international law provisions applicable in this context–intended
both to demonstrate the extent to which the ISA deviates from widely-upheld international norms,
even if those norms are not ones expressly accepted by Malaysia. We have also referenced the
extent to which other States, contemplating reviving or enacting similar laws, will fall afoul of
their more readily undertaken international obligations in doing so.

SPECIAL REPORT
UNJUST ORDER: MALAYSIA'S INTERNAL
SECURITY ACT
Nicole Fritz* & Martin Flaherty**
INTRODUCTION
The Petronas Towers - two soaring office blocks in the
heart of Kuala Lumpur - rise cleanly from their base. Few
neighboring skyscrapers hem their space and it is this contrast to
their surrounding landscape that makes them, arguably, even
more arresting than the Twin Towers they so obviously recall. In
a post-September 11 world, their symbolism, once thought principally to reflect Malaysia's formidable economic growth,1 has
become much more sinister: reminding also of Malaysia's vulnerability to terrorist attacks of the kind suffered in New York. Yet,
paradoxically, their continued standing, the mere fact of their
existence, serves to demonstrate that Malaysia has so far successfully protected against threats of this kind.
The Towers are simultaneously both indictment and affirmation: mirroring the conduct of the Malaysian government
post-September 11. The government led by Prime Minister Dr.
Mahathir Mohamad, seeks to emphasize the seriousness of a terrorist threat and Malaysia's potential vulnerability in order tojustify the taking of special measures on its part, and to demand
deference from Malaysian citizens in adopting such measures. 2
* Fellow, Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights, 2001-2002;
Scholar-In-Residence, Fordham Law School, 2002-2003.
** Professor of Law, Fordham Law School; Co-Director, Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights.
I. See JOHN HILLEY, MALAYSIA: MAHATHIRISM, HEGEMONY AND THE NEW OPPOSITION
3 (2001) (observing that the Petronas Towers have been invoked "as a celebratory statement of national achievement - perhaps even a two-fingered gesture to the old colonial order," but arguing that a more appropriate metaphor might be "the sense of duality with the West: a separation of identities standing together in tense proximity, a representation of the continuous convergence and conflict of ideas.").
2. See Prime Minister Mahathir, Budget Speech (Sept. 20, 2002), available at http:/
/www.smpke.jpm.my/WebNotesApp/PMMain.nsf/fsMainPM.
Today, there are Muslims who have become fanatical to the extent of using
violence, including bombing and resorting to murder as well as plotting to
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On the other hand, the absence of attack is emphasized, too, as
it validates the employment of special measures and of a strong,
authoritative government.
Although a number of different measures have been
adopted,4 the notorious Internal Security Act ("ISA") 5 has been
wielded most visibly in response to alleged security fears. The
ISA is an expansive law but it is its provision for indefinite detention without trial to which the State has most frequent resort: the
first sixty days of this detention are typically at the initiation of
police authorities, and subsequent two-year periods occur at the
authorization and renewal of the Minister of Home Affairs. In
the months immediately preceding and subsequent to September 11, more than seventy individuals have been arrested and
detained under its provisions, allegedly for involvement in militant Islamic activities. Government disclosure supporting such
assessment, however, extends in many cases only to reports of
membership in the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia or, alternatively, the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia ("KKM") - an alleged
group with militant objectives, the existence of which has yet to
be independently verified.
It would, however, be misleading to suggest that the use of
the ISA is novel or only disturbing in the context of recent developments. The Act has existed almost as long as independence
itself and has been used to delegitimize generations of political
opposition and silence those considered "deviant" or "subversive" by the government. It has long attracted significant opposition from human rights groups located both in and outside the
country, and the decision by the Joseph R. Crowley Program in
overthrow the Government. If they had been successful in executing their
plans, the nation will [sic] plunge into instability and utter chaos, resulting in
the deterioration of the economy. We have spared the nation from this turmoil with the rule of law practised by the Government. The Internal Security
Act (ISA) has indeed saved the [N]ation.
Id.
3. Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi announced soon after September 11
that the attacks demonstrated the value of the ISA as "an initial preventive measure
before threats get beyond control." See Human Rights Watch, Opportunism in the Face of
Tragedy, at http://www.hrw.org/ campaigns/septemberl I /opportunismwatch.
htm#Malaysia.
4. One of the most recent developments is the proposal that young Malaysians
serve a period of national service designed to protect Malaysia from security threats. See
Mustafa K. Anuar, To Serve With Love, 22(10) ALIRAN MONTHLY 9 (2002).
5. Internal Security Act, Act 82 of 1960 [hereinafter ISA].
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International Human Rights at Fordham Law School to focus on
Malaysia and the ISA was made prior to the events of September
11. Recent events, nonetheless, add urgency to the review of Malaysia and its employment of the ISA. These events have been
employed to justify increased numbers of arrests and detentions
of a particular set of individuals - alleged Islamic militants and have served to substantially reverse the impetus for reform,
both among the Malaysian public and, to the extent such inclination existed, within the government. Review is also of greater
global application given the number of States that now seek to
enact or revive similar laws in the belief that these laws are an
essential component of any effective strategy in the fight against
global terrorism.
This Report represents the culmination of a year-long project undertaken by the Crowley Program to update the study of
the use and impact of the ISA in Malaysia in light of international law obligations. We have been concerned to reference
first, those international commitments that Malaysia has expressly adopted. However, these are very few - reflecting the
antipathy felt by the Malaysian government for international obligations of this sort.6 Additionally, we have made reference to
the generally accepted international law provisions applicable in
this context - intended both to demonstrate the extent to which
the ISA deviates from widely upheld international norms, even if
those norms are not ones expressly accepted by Malaysia, and
the extent to which other States, contemplating reviving or enacting similar laws, will fall afoul of their more readily undertaken international obligations in doing so.
The Fordham delegation was led by Professor Martin Flaherty and Nicole Fritz, the 2001-02 Crowley Fellow, and included
Judge Azhar Cachalia of the Johannesburg High Court of South
Africa; Lauris Wren of the New York City Bar Association's Refugee Assistance Program; and six second-year Fordham law stu6. Only the following conventions are binding on Malaysia by express acceptance:
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (with a number of reservations); Convention
on the Rights of the Child (with a number of reservations); Convention on the Abolition of Slavery; Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (with a number of
reservations); Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide; ILO Convention 98 on Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively. See Meredith
L. Weiss, The Malaysian Human Rights Movement, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN MALAYSIA:
FROM MORAL COMMUNITIES TO NGO's (Meredith L. Weiss & Saliha Hassan eds., 2003).
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dents: John Anderson, Jean Del Colliano, Lissett Ferreira, Diana
Masone, Gregory Milne and Vivianna Stubbe. 7 Following the
practice established in previous missions, the Crowley delegation
participated in an intense program of study throughout the aca-

demic year preceding the mission.' This included a seminar addressing human rights issues in Malaysia specifically. While in
Malaysia from June I to June 14, 2002, the delegation met with a

broad range of individuals: lawyers, former judges, governmentappointed human rights commissioners, non-governmental organization ("NGO") activists, former detainees, families of detainees, members of the political opposition, and academics.'
Despite repeated requests for meetings with government officials
during the mission, all requests either met with no response or
were declined."0 The delegation conducted approximately 100
ISA-related interviews in all.
These interviews were conducted principally in Kuala
7. The recommendations contained in this report are those of the Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights at Fordham Law School and do not necessarily reflect the views of every delegation member. Professor Bridget Welsh of the
School of Advanced International Studies ("SAIS"), Johns Hopkins University, and a
Johns Hopkins SAIS student, Amy Goad, also accompanied the delegation during the
first week of the mission, but did not participate in subsequent deliberations informing
the Report.
8. See Crowley Program in International Human Rights & Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, Justice on Trial: State Security Court, Police Impunity, and the Intimidationof
Human Rights Defenders in Turkey, 22 FORDHAM INT'L LJ 2129 (1999); Crowley Program
in International Human Rights, One Country, Two Legal Systems, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1
(1999); Crowley Program in International Human Rights & Centro de Derechos Humanos, Miguel Agustin Pro Judrez Presumed Guilty?: CriminalJustice and Human Rights In Mexico, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 801 (2001); Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgins, Promise
Unfulfilled: Law, Culture and Women's Inheritance Rights in Ghana, Report of the Joseph R.
Crowley Program in InternationalHuman Rights, 25 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 259 (2001).
9. The Crowley Program wishes to thank everyone who met with our delegation
and who gave their time and assistance. We are especially indebted to Suaram, without
whom our ISA-related investigations would not have taken place. We would like to
thank particularly Cynthia Gabriel and Yap Swee Sang. Additionally we wish to thank
the many individuals who, prior to the mission, gave generously of their advice, contacts
and information: Irene Fernandez, Malik lmtiaz Sarwar, Jomo K.S, Pawancheek Marican, Patricia Martinez, Anil Netto, Sivarasa Rasiah, Karim Raslan, Meredith Weiss and
Bridget Welsh all provided invaluable assistance and insight, even if the final report and
its focus strays from their initial advice. Finally, we would like to thank Judge Azhar
Cachalia for accompanying our delegation. Once a political activist against apartheid
who suffered detention under South Africa's own Internal Security Act, he now serves
as a judge in a democratic South Africa. His dual insights - as former detainee and
now as upholder of the law - enriched our understanding immeasurably.
10. A draft version of this Report was, however, made available to the Malaysian
government for comment.
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Lumpur and it was here that members of the mission were able
to observe a habeas corpus petition brought on behalf of an ISA
detainee, allegedly involved in militant Islamic activities." Members of the mission also traveled to Terengganu and Kelantan,
States controlled by the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia ("PAS") - regions from which a number of the most recent ISA detainees are
drawn - and to Malaysia's second city, Penang.
Based on international human rights standards, as well as
Malaysia's own domestic law, the mission identified five areas of
focus in respect of ISA-authorized arrests and detentions: (1) the
emergency framework of preventive detention laws; (2) reasonable suspicion or probable cause triggering arrest and detention;
(3) legal defense and access to counsel; (4) forms of review; and
(5) conditions of detention. The delegation paid particular attention to factors which contribute to and exacerbate the ISA's
repressive effect, including: measures against judges that might
be characterized as punitive or retaliatory in those rare instances
in which habeas corpus petitions are upheld; and governmentsponsored initiatives that seek to mold a more pliant, less independent Bar Council. The mission further examined the social,
economic, and particularly political context, in which ISA arrests
and detentions take place. The ISA, although often the most
ferocious, is merely one of a number of laws on Malaysia's statute
books that serves to severely curtail and undermine civil liberties
and human rights. 1 2 Together these laws contribute to the creation of a deeply authoritarian political environment, in which
attacks on independent voices - whether they emanate from the
media, academia or the opposition - are routine.
As this Report documents, substantial evidence points to
pervasive State-driven or sponsored violations of the rights of ISA
11. The habeas corpus petition was brought on behalf of Sejahtul Dursina, a.k.a.
Chomel Mohamad, wife of Yazid Sufaat.
12. See Memorandum from the Malaysian Bar Council on the Repeal of Laws Relating to Detention Without Trial (1998). The Memorandum identifies three major
laws in force in Malaysia that provide for detention without trial: the Internal Security
Act (1960); the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969;
and the Dangerous Drugs (Special Prevention Measures) Act 1985. It further identifies
"eleven other pieces of legislation that curtail and/or marginalize civil rights": the Restricted Residence Act 1933; the Sedition Act 1948; the Public Order (Preservation) Act
1958; the Prevention of Crimes Act 1959; the Trade Unions Act 1959; the Police Act
1967; the Societies Act 1966; the Universities and University Colleges Act 1971; the
Official Secrets Act 1972; the Essential (Security Cases) Regulations 1975; and the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984. Id.
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detainees, including: the arbitrary arrest and detention of suspects; the failure to provide adequate access to legal counsel; the
absence of any effective forms of review of arrest and detention,
or of the conditions in which detainees are kept; and the infliction of intolerable conditions of detention and treatment, that if
not torture (and sometimes it is), nonetheless systematically exceeds the point at which treatment becomes cruel, inhuman,
and degrading. 3
These abuses should, without more, merit the gravest concern. However, ISA arrests and detentions have an additionally
egregious face, beyond the individual abuse and violation they
effect. They serve, as the delegation was told time and again
during interviews, to remove opposition leaders or potential
leaders, effectively silencing their critical voices. Their detentions create vacuums and often leave the respective groups in
disarray. The arrests and attendant abuses also discourage any
other individuals from voluntarily assuming the leadership positions that have been left vacant.' 4 The ISA is thus critically
deployed to impede mobilization on the part of the political opposition and any other groups deemed undesirable by the government. In the result, freedom of association, assembly, expression, and even religion (given that many of the groups deemed
undesirable are Shi'Ite Muslims) are severely narrowed.'" Obviously, not every arrest and detention will be prompted by these
ulterior motives. Some arrests presumably respond to legitimate
security considerations and recent events and developments suggest the existence of very real threats that Malaysia must treat
seriously. The delegation was conscious of the fact that it was
13. Violations mandated or encouraged by the ISA are not limited to those documented in this Report. For instance, Section 57 of the ISA provides that in certain
circumstances, individuals found in possession of a fire-arm "without lawful excuse, the
onus of proving which shall be on that person ... shall be guilty of an offence and shall,
on conviction be punished with death." ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 57. These provisions have
merited and continue to merit severe criticism. However, the mission focused on those
violations typically experienced by individuals detained under the ISA for ostensible
security purposes.
14. See Interview with Ngeow Yin Hgee, Lawyer for ISA detainees in 1980s (June 2,
2002) (noting that without the six KeADILan detainees "the entire party is defunct.").
15. The Report might plausibly have focused on the effect of the ISA on any or all
of these rights and the Report makes a number of observations with respect to these
rights. However, the mission chose to concentrate on those violations brought about
through the detention process and those manifested in the operations of the criminal
justice system.
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not equipped to evaluate the extent or seriousness of security
threats facing Malaysia. Nonetheless, Malaysia's history of spuriously motivated arrests raises the presumption of bad-faith on
the part of the government - one that is difficult to rebut.
Despite the disincentives for political activism, Malaysia
nonetheless boasts a large number of courageous opposition activists. Opposition political parties continue to mobilize and critique the government. Outside of the strictly party-political
sphere, groups like Suaram, Aliran, Hakam, and Chandra Muzaffar's Movement for a Just World, draw attention to the government's pervasive failure to respect fundamental human rights,
notwithstanding their own members' susceptibility to ISA arrest
and detention. The ISA itself has become the subject of a massbased campaign - the Abolish ISA Movement ("AIM") - and
groups like the Malaysian Bar Council have called for its repeal.' 6 Sectors within Malaysia's civil society have thus consistently acted to protect and promote human rights. The state sector too has evidenced, at least in some respects, a more serious
treatment of human rights and civil liberties. In July 1999, the
National Human Rights Commission ("SU-LAKAM") was established, and expressly mandated to have regard in the performance of its functions to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ("UDHR").' 7 Among its more notable accomplishments,
the Commission has conducted a high-profile investigation into
alleged police abuse during a public demonstration; 8 called for
Parliament to review several oppressive laws, including the ISA,
and urged the Parliament to ratify the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), and
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT").' 9 Nonetheless,
16. Memorandum from the Malaysian Bar Council, supra n.12, at 1. At the Malaysian Bar Council's general meeting on October 10, 1998, attended by some 2,480 lawyers, a unanimous resolution was adopted calling for the repeal of the ISA, the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969, and the Dangerous
Drugs Act 1985.
17. A substantial caveat was attached to this injunction. See Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 597 of 1999, art. 4(4) [hereinafter Act 597 of 1999].
18. See
RIGHTS

SUARAM,

MALAYSIAN

HUMAN

181 (2001) [hereinafter SUARAM

port).
19. Id. at 174.

RIGHTS

REPORT]

REPORT

2001: CIVIL

AND

POLITICAL

(documenting the Kesas Highway Re-
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its overall record is mixed and a number of recent controversial
appointments have served to erode confidence in its willingness
to substantially challenge government policy.2 However, as this
Report went to press, SUHAKAM launched a thorough-going
critique of the ISA, calling for its repeal. 2 ' It is hoped that this
Report - many of its recommendations and conclusions similar
to those of SUHAKAM - adds to public impetus for repeal of
the ISA and other wide-ranging, ancillary reform.
The structure of the main body of the Report (Part II) mirrors the issues that the mission examined. Section I examines
the justificatory framework for detention without trial laws,
namely emergency conditions, and the extent to which Malaysia's reliance on such a framework in current conditions is invalid. Section II documents the absence of reasonable suspicion
or probable cause supporting ISA-authorized arrests and detentions. In Section III, the Report addresses the issue of legal representation and the restrictions on access to counsel, including
absolute denial of access at stages during detention at which the
detainee is most vulnerable. The almost complete absence of
any effective form of review of the ISA-authorized arrests and
detentions is the subject of Section IV. Section V examines the
conditions of detention to which detainees are subject and the
treatment shown them by officials. Each section chronicles the
mission's evidence, discusses applicable international and
human rights standards, and concludes with findings and recommendations. While findings and recommendations are documented in discrete sections of the Report, realization of many of
these recommendations, ostensibly applicable to only one sec20. In order for these appointments to take place, three of the original commissioners failed to have their contracts renewed. Two of the three were the commissioners
who conducted the inquiry into the Kesas Highway incident. The other had conducted
an examination of the situation of indigenous people in Sarawak. The new head of
SUHAKAM is a former Attorney-General who, in the past, explicitly endorsed the ISA.
See Interview with Yap Swee San and Cynthia Gabriel, members of Suaram (June 2,
2002).
21. SUHAKAM, Review of the Internal Security Act 1960 (April, 2003) available at
http://www.suhakam.org.my. While SUHAKAM deservedly merits acclaim for its report, we note with concern its recommendation that new anti-terrorist legislation be
enacted. The report makes no enquiry as to whether already existing legislation might
serve this purpose. Moreover, it frames the proposed legislation by reference to recently enacted comparative laws, like the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, the UK's Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and India's Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
2001 - all of which themselves raise serious human rights concerns.
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tion of the Report, would in many cases act to ameliorate abuses
documented in other sections.
These divisions have been drawn to allow for a clear appreciation of abuses brought about by the ISA; however, they inadequately capture the context in which ISA arrests and detentions
take place - a context essential for understanding the chilling
effect of this Act, its many-tentacled reach beyond the individual
arrests and detentions it affects, and its position as the government's most potent weapon of repression.
Part I of the Report attempts to provide this contextual perspective by briefly examining the history of the ISA, and examining the circumstances of two recent, high-profile bouts of ISA
arrests and detentions - those of the "KeADILan-10" and the
even more recent arrests of a much larger group of individuals
allegedly involved with militant Islam.
PART I
A. Introduction
In the more than forty years of the ISA's existence, motivations for ISA arrests and detentions have varied - as subsequent
sections elaborate - but the typical experience of the ISA detainee has gone relatively unchanged. He (more often than she)
is arrested by police officials, ostensibly for having acted "in a
manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part
thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to
the economic life thereof," and kept in police custody for a period of sixty days (although the duration may sometimes be
slightly less)22 During this period, he is kept in a small, unventi22. See ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 73. Section 73 of the ISA provides:
(1) Any police officer may without warrant arrest and detain pending enquiries any person in respect of whom he has reason to believe (a) that there are grounds which would justify his detention under section 8; and
(b) that he has acted or is about to act or is likely to act in any manner
prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof.
(2) Any police officer may without warrant arrest and detain pending enquiries any person, who upon being questioned by the officer fails to satisfy the
officer as to his identity or as to the purposes for which he is in the place
where he is found and who the officer suspects has acted or is about to act in
any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the
maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof.

1354

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 26:1345

lated cell with few amenities, denied access to counsel and more
often than not to his family and subjected to prolonged periods
of interrogation during which mental and often physical stress is
applied. At the end of the sixty-day period, the detainee is typically transferred to the Kamunting Detention Camp, located several hours from Kuala Lumpur, under orders of the Minister of

Home Affairs.2" Conditions at the camp are marginally better
than those in police custody, but the prospect of indefinite detention - two-year detention orders may be endlessly renewed make the experience intolerably bleak. At no point in this process is the detainee given the opportunity of contesting and dis-

proving the government's allegations at trial. Although the ISA
mandates an internal review process,

24

the statute offers no

(3) Any person arrested under this section may be detained for a period not
exceeding sixty days without an order of detention having been made in respect of him under [S]ection 8:
Provided that (a) he shall not be detained for longer than twenty-four hours except with
the authority of a police officer of or above the rank of Inspector;
(b) he shall not be detained for more than forty-eight hours except with
the authority of a police officer of or above the rank of Assistant Superintendent; and
(c) he shall not be detained for more than thirty days unless a police
officer of or above the rank of Deputy Superintendent has reported the circumstances of the arrest and detention to the Inspector-General or to a police
officer designated by the inspector-General in that behalf, who shall forthwith
report the same to the Minister.
Id.
23. See ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 8. Section 8(1) of the ISA provides:
If the Minister is satisfied that the detention of any person is necessary with a
view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security
of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services
therein or to the economic life thereof, he may make an order (hereinafter
referred to as a detention order) directing that that person be detained for
any period not exceeding two years.
Id.
24. See ISA, supra n.5, Sec. I1 and Sec. 12. Section 11 (1) of the ISA provides:
A copy of every order made by the Minister under section 8(1) shall as soon as
may be after the making thereof be served on the person to whom it relates,
and every person shall be entitled to make representations against the order
to an Advisory Board.
Id. Section 12(2) of the ISA provides:
Upon considering the recommendations of the Advisory Board under this section the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may give the Minister such directions, if any,
as he shall think fit regarding the order made by the Minister; and every decision of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong thereon shall, subject to section 13, be
final, and shall not be called into question in any court.
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meaningful prospect of release and opportunities to challenge
the legality of the detention before a court are few - constrained by statutory provision 25 and limited access to counsel.
The sections that follow examine the history of this law the circumstances in which it has been deployed and the ends it
has served - in an attempt to show the broader civil and political
distortions created by the ISA that go beyond the individual violations extensively documented in Part II of the Report. The last
section of Part I, as a precursor to Part II, looks at the standards
by which the delegation assessed these individual violations principally those set by international human rights law - and
outlines why Malaysia, despite its antipathy, may justly be held to
these standards.
B. History of the ISA
In the years preceding the end of colonial rule in Malaysia,
a communist insurgency arose that agitated for independence
more aggressively than other nationalist forces then established
in the country. The British colonial authorities responded with
Emergency Regulations, the ISA's precursor, that similarly provided for detention without trial. Malaysia retained the Regulations at independence in 1957 but in 1960, the new Parliament
enacted the ISA, aimed at suppressing the insurgent militants
26
who continued to mobilize, particularly along the borders.
Throughout the 1960s, ISA-arrests and detentions targeted
those ostensibly involved in communist activities, most particularly members of the then Labour Party which formed part of
25. See ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 16. Section 16 of the ISA provides:
Nothing in this Chapter or in any rnles made thereunder shall require the
Minister or any member of an Advisory Board or any public servant to disclose
facts or to produce documents [even before a Court] which he considers it to
be against the national interest to disclose or produce.
Id. See also id. Sec. 8B. Section 8B, introduced by a 1988 amendment, provides:
There shall be no judicial review in any court of, and no court shall have or
exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done or decision made by the
Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their discretionary
power in accordance with the Act, save in regard to any question on compliance with any procedural requirement in this Act governing such act or decision.
Id.
26. For overviews of this period, see SAID ZAHAR, DARK CLOUDS AT DAWN: A POLITISee also EDMUND TERENCE GOMEZ &JOMO KS., MALAYSIA'S POLITI

CAL MEMOIR (2001).

CAL ECONOMY: POLITICS, PATRONAGE AND PROFITS

10-23 (1997).
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the Socialist Front, but the late 1960s provided yet another ostensible justification for ISA arrests and detentions. In 1969, the
country's most explosive race riots erupted against a backdrop of
the ruling Alliance's first-time ever loss of its two-thirds parliamentary majority. In the wake of these riots in which over 200
people were killed and sections of Kuala Lumpur were left devastated, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the King) declared a state of
emergency, Parliament and the Constitution were suspended,
and the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 ("EPOPCO") was enacted.2 7 But although
EPOPCO was devised as the direct response to the riots and remains in force, the ISA was then upheld and continues to be
upheld as a shield against renewed racial hostility.
The end of the 1960s, however, did not only usher in a new
justification for the use of the ISA. Loss of political support for
the ruling Alliance's dominant party, the United Malays' National Organization ("UMNO"), and the violence of the riots,
signaled an increasing discontent on the part of many ethnic
Malays with the prevailing status quo. The New Economic Policy
("NEP"), unveiled in 1970, was intended to address these grievances. The NEP aimed to stimulate growth generally, reduce
poverty and achieve "inter-ethnic economic parity between the
predominantly Malay Bumiputeras and the predominantly Chinese non-Bumiputeras, 2 2 and consequently, entailed a much
greater emphasis in government policy on economic well-being.
Alongside this government-led empowerment project, more organic grass-roots initiatives aimed at political and economic advancement also became more pronounced. Groups such as the
Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia ("ABIM") 2 ' and other Islamic associations promoting an Islamic resurgence and an embrace of
27. Ordinance 5 of 1969. Its provisions are substantially similar to those of the
ISA, but in the case of EPOPCO, police officers must have reason to believe when effecting arrest and the Minister must be satisfied when issuing a detention order that
such arrest or detention is necessary to prevent the individual from acting in a "manner
prejudicial to public order," or that it is necessary for the "suppression of violence or
the prevention of crimes involving violence."
28. GOMEZ & JOMO, supra n.26, at 24. The term "Bumiputeras" is a Malay word
meaning "sons of the soil," and is used in Malaysian political discourse generally to
indicate ethnic Malays.
29. Translated as the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement, then led by Anwar
Ibrahim who was later to become a member of UMNO and Deputy Prime Minister
under Prime Minister Mahathir.
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"authentic" Islamic identity, enjoyed widespread popularity.3 0
Yet, despite the intersection of their objectives with those of the
government in seeking ethnic Malay advancement, their tendency to vocally criticize the government and take to the streets
in protest provoked both the ire of the executive and its power
to exercise the ISA. It was this bid to silence student activists that
became characteristic of ISA-authorized arrests and detentions
carried out during the 1970s.
The 1980s promised change: the new Prime Minister,
Mahathir Mohamad, had himself expressed criticism for the ISA
early in his career, and a diminished resort to the ISA in the
early years of the 1980s fueled expectations that the government's use of repressive legislation would abate. 3 Nonetheless,
in 1987, the ISA was deployed to widespread, notoriously abusive
effect. 2 Amidst faltering economic growth, an acrimonious, divisive leadership struggle within UMNO, and heightening MalayChinese tensions, over one hundred opposition figures were arrested under the ISA. Trade unionists, academics, church workers, public intellectuals, NGO activists and opposition leaders
were all targeted in what was known as "Operation Lalang." The
media was also subject to increased restrictions and a day before
the Supreme Court was to oversee a challenge to Mahathir's
UMNO leadership, Federal Court President Tun Salleh Abbas
was dismissed.
Political turmoil seemed less a feature of the Malaysian landscape once economic prosperity resumed in the late 1980s and
early 1990s - then at such levels that Malaysia was heralded as
one of the East Asian economic miracles. Impressive economic
performance was credited, in large part to responsible, forwardthinking leadership on the part of the Malaysian political elite
and Mahathir's pronouncements that "Western-orientated"
human rights were incompatible with an "Asian" emphasis on
community and public order, and an apparent East Asian aptitude for economic growth, if internationally provocative, none30. Meredith L. Weiss, VWat Will Become of Reformasi?Ethnicity and ChangingPolitical
Norms in Malaysia, in CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST AsA 424 (1999).
31. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON MALAYStA, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDERMINED:
RESTRICTfIVE LAWS IN A PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACy, A.I. Index: ASA 28/06/99, available
at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ASA280061999.
32. Gomez &Jomo note that it was the "the worst abuse of the ISA" in the 1970s.
See GOMEZ & JOMO, supra n.26, at 2.
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theless won tacit compliance at home. By 1998, that compliance
had dissipated as the economy imploded and yet another leadership struggle emerged - this time between Mahathir and his
deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, which resulted in Anwar's dismissal
from his Cabinet posts as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance
Minister and his suspension from UMNO."3 In the days following his departure, Anwar took his challenge beyond the precincts of UMNO's political structures and toured the country.
Anwar's history of activism within ABIM and other Islamic
NGOs, and the perception of him by non-Islamic, non-Malay
groups as having acted as a modernizing influence within the
government, allowed Anwar to enjoy popular appeal and enabled him to bring about a broad-based alliance of opposition
groups. The Reformasi movement, as it was popularly known,
with its spirit of inter-ethnic cooperation challenged traditional
Malaysian political discourse and the political structures and
prompted severe response. 4 A few weeks after his dismissal,
Anwar 3 5 and a number of his followers were arrested and detained under the ISA. The physical abuse he suffered during
detention and disclosed when he appeared in court, after intense domestic and international pressure, only spurred the
Reformasi movement and its call for 'justice for Anwar."3 6 Huge
public protests, unparalleled in the country's history resulted.
The violent repression these protests occasioned and, in part,
signs of economic recovery served to subdue the unrest. The
Reformasi movement, however, remained active and was to be33. Weiss,, supra n.30, at 424. As Weiss explains, although Anwar was ostensibly
fired for sexual misconduct, the reason behind the dismissal was said to be a disagreement between Anwar and Mahathir about aspects of national economic policies - an
explanation seemingly corroborated by the fact that "the sacking coincided precisely
with the sudden imposition of stringent currency and capital controls." Id.
34. Id.
35. On September 20, 1998, Anwar was detained under the ISA but a few days
thereafter he was held on criminal charges. In 1998, he was tried for four counts of
corruption - allegedly having instructed police officials to conceal evidence of his sexual misconduct - and in 1999 for sodomy. Both trials resulted in conviction and prison
sentences. Each was widely criticized for failing to conform to fair trial standards. Subsequently, two appeals on the corruption convictions have been dismissed. Currently,
Anwar remains imprisoned, despite reports of serious ill-health. In his last public appearances Anwar was seen in a wheelchair and a neck-brace, raising concern that the
beating he suffered while in police custody has resulted in permanent damage. During
the mission, the delegation met with several individuals who expressed their concern
that Anwar's health had been deliberately endangered during his imprisonment.
36. Weiss, supra n.30.
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come the subject of yet more high-profile ISA arrests and detentions - notably the "KeADILan 10".
Before discussing these arrests in more detail, it is worth
presenting certain features that have characterized previous
waves of ISA arrests - not only because they are illustrative in
themselves, but because these help predict current and future
circumstances in which ISA arrests will take place. Many of the
high-profile bouts of arrests and detentions have occurred during periods of economic downturn. While economic instability
may, without more, act as a partial trigger for ISA arrests (arrests
may serve as diversionary measures), far more significant in the
eyes of public officials is the popular unrest it prompts. In periods of economic well-being, it is unlikely that "the average Malaysian will choose transparency, accountability and 'justice for all'
over a proven record of economic development ... and relative
stability. '3 7 This is not the case during economic difficulties,
when the population exhibits far less tolerance for repressive
government policies and is far more prepared to vocally criticize
the government, and risk detention under the ISA.
A related and more important indicator is the appearance
of political movements and structures that challenge traditional
Malaysian political mobilization. Malaysia generally enjoys
peaceful, ordered relations among the different ethnic groups;
yet, this co-existence is more a function of political accommodation of the separate groups than real integration. Although the
ruling alliance, the Barisan Nasional ("BN") (National Front)
draws support from all three major ethnic groups, it does so because it comprises parties that appeal to the separate ethnic
groups individually.3" Political movements that attempt to mobilize across ethnic lines, and so muddle traditional constituencies, challenge the political predicate of ethnic "apartness" that
is harnessed for political gain. Consequently, leaders and activ-

37. Id. See also Patricia Martinez, The Islamic State or the State of Islam in Malaysia,
474, at 484 (2001) (stating that "[a] privileging of economic
well-being is a major factor in the lack of resistance to the loss of fundamental freedoms
and civil rights by most of the Malaysian middle-class, regardless of the ethnic group,
the rationale being 'don't disturb a good thing."').
38. Primarily, the United Malays National Organization ("UMNO") directed at
Malays; the Malaysian Chinese Association ("MCA") directed at the Chinese; and the
Malaysian Indian Congress ("MIC") directed at Indians.
CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA
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ists within these movements have often been targets of ISA arrests and detentions.
ISA arrests and detentions also often coincide with periods
of heightened Islamic discourse within the Malaysian political
arena. Ethnic Malays are by definition Muslim 9 and UMNO,
promoted as the political home of ethnic Malays, engages and
accommodates Malay Islamic identity. Mahathir, in particular,
has "sought to consecrate the idea that UMNO speaks not only
for Malays, but for Islam."4"' When other groups - political parties or NGOs - attempt successfully to appeal to the same constituency on the basis that they are more legitimate, sincere
guardians of Islamic identity, individuals within these groups are
often likely to be subject to ISA arrests and detentions. These
features are identifiable in the following section in which the ISA
arrests and detentions of the "KeADILan" ten and of alleged Islamic militants are discussed.
C. Recent Arrests
1. Arrests of the "KeADILan 10"
In April 1999, days before the verdict in Anwar Ibrahim's
first trial, his wife, Wan Azizah, announced the formation of the
Parti KeADILan Nasional ("KeADILan")." In orientation it explicitly attempted to surmount the country's inter-ethnic divides,
and espoused multi-racial aspirations.42 It very rapidly assumed
the role of primary opposition party, explained to some degree
by the fact that it "offered a meaningful alternative for Malay39. See MAtAY. CoNsT., art. 160. Article 160 defines a "Malay" as:
a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom and (a) was before Merdeka Day born in the Federation or in Singapore or
born of parents one of whom was born in the Federation or in Singapore, or is
on that day domiciled in the Federation or in Singapore; or
(b) is the issue of such a person.
Id.
40. See HinL-EY, supra n.1, at 185.

41. Translated as the "National Justice Party." The party followed Wan Azizah's
earlier formation in December 1998 of the Pergerakan KeADILan Sosial (Movement
for Social Justice), known as "ADIL." ld. at 152.
42. It should be noted that like the Reformasi movement itself, of which it was a
major constituent, KeADILan's leaders are primarily young, middle-class Malay men,
suggesting that the party is not as multiracial and egalitarian as its leaders profess. See
Weiss, supra n.30, who makes this point with respect to the Reformasi movement more
broadly.
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sians uncomfortable with the perceived religio-ethnic options of
PAS [Parti Islam SeMalaysia] and DAP [Democratic Action
Party]."" 3 By late 1999, KeADILan together with other prominent opposition groups - PAS4 4 , DAP and Parti Rakyat Malaysia 4 5 ("PRM") - had formed the Barisan Alternatif ("BA") 46 and
readied itself to contest elections on this basis. The selection of
Anwar Ibrahim as the BA's nominal leader confirmed the primacy of KeADILan within the alliance, because while he had no
official role within the party, he was, nonetheless, perceived as its
guiding force.
Yet, despite indications to the contrary, the BA failed to significantly erode the BN's electoral majority, as evidenced during
the November 1999 elections where the BN retained its longstanding two-thirds majority and secured Mahathir a fifth successive term in office.4 7 Election tallies, however, fail to accurately
reflect the real shift that had occurred - the BA seized 40% of
the popular vote and the State of Terengganu, formerly controlled by UMNO, was won by PAS, signalling the emergence of
"a rural-urban/north-south divide."4 8 The resumption of
Anwar's second trial in January 2000, refocused attention on the
issues that had initially sparked Reformasi and inspired a government crackdown on BA-aligned media. This censorship, together with the upholding of Anwar's original conviction for corruption, reaffirmed the government's heavy-handed approach.
Significantly, Malaysians newly discomforted by this approach
were presented with a credible alternative to the BN in the form
of the BA and the survival of the alliance beyond the period of
the elections disproved accusations of cooperation solely for the
purpose of political convenience.
Early in 2001, KeADILan won the symbolically important
Lunas by-election, a traditionally safe BN seat. This electoral victory in an ethnically mixed constituency indicated that
Mahathir's frequent invocation of the Indonesian race riots,
which had effectively frightened Malaysians, particularly the Chinese, against supporting Reformasi objectives, had lost much of
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See HILLEY, supra n.1, at 227.
Translated as "the Islamic Party of Malaysia."
Translated as "the Malaysian People's Party."
Translated as "the Alternative Front."
HILLEY, supra n.1, at 260.
Id. at 264.
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its power. This scare-mongering was buttressed by far more severe means of instilling fear in April 2001 when ten young,
prominent individuals associated with KeADILan, many of them
leaders of the party,49 were arrested and detained under the
ISA. 5" A press statement on April 11, issued by the Inspector
General of the Police, Norian Mai, suggested that all ten were
arrested to prevent their using bombs and grenade launchers to
topple the government.
Four of these ten have subsequently been released: two
(Badaruddin Ismail and Raja Petra Kamaruddin) at the initiative
of the police authorities; and two others (N. Gobalakrishnan and
Abdul Ghani Haron) by habeas corpus petition - an outcome
notable in Malaysia for its rarity. The remaining six (Mohd Ezam
Mohd Nor, Hishamuddin Rais, Chua Tian Chang, Lokman Nor
Adam, Dr. Badrulamin Bahron and Saari Sungib)5 2 had their initial sixty day detentions extended to two years and are currently
in the Kamunting Detention Center:
The affidavits of all ten confirm that police interrogation
during their sixty-day detention periods routinely failed to canvass their alleged involvement in insurgency efforts, despite the
Inspector General's earlier pronouncement. 5
As Judge
Mohamed Dzaiddin noted in their Federal Court Appeal:
[D]espite the press statement of the respondent that the appellants were detained because they were a threat to national
security, it is surprising to note from the appellants affidavits
that they were not interrogated on the militant actions and
neither were they questioned about getting explosive materi49. See Interview with YB Ramil B. Ibrahim, KeADILan MP, (June 5, 2002) (explaining that "the six who were detained were key figures because they had the ability to
unite people and organize the masses. They were young, up-and-coming people within
the party."). Interview (June 5, 2002).
50. Seven were detained several days before a huge gathering was to take place
before the National Human Rights Commission, SUHAKAM, in order to commemorate
the second anniversary of the conviction of Anwar Ibrahim. See SUARAM REPORT, supra
n.18, at 24.
51. Id.
52. Mohamad Ezam Mohd Noor and Chua Tian Chang are also facing criminal
charges for offences they allegedly committed during the Lunas by-election. SUARAM
REPORT, supra n.18, at 149.
53. Id. Dr. Badrulamin Bahron was released from Kamunting on November 3,
2001 and placed under a Restricted Residence order, but has subsequently been sent
back to the Kamunting Detention Center. Id. at 27.
54. Much more detail about the nature of the interrogations is provided in a subsequent section of the Report.
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the questions that were asked

were more on the appellants' political activities and for intelligence gathering. I find that there is much force in the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the detentions were for an ulterior purpose and unconnected with national security.5 5
The circumstances of their detentions are elaborated in greater
detail in a later section of the Report.
2. Arrests of Alleged Islamic Militants
Anwar's arrest and the emergence of the Reformasi movement didn't only allow for the establishment of a new social justice party, KeADILan; it also promoted the revival and enhancement of already existing opposition parties - most notably
PAS.56 PAS has long promoted itself as the political home of
Islam in Malaysia, setting itself up in direct competition with
UMNO, which has also sought to "mandate, control and harness
the icons, symbols and images of Islam."5 7 UMNO has responded to the challenge brought by political parties and Islamic-orientated NGOs to the legitimacy of its invocation of Islam with a variety of strategies. In an attempt to win over traditional elements to its more modernist elaboration of Islam,
UMNO has attempted to assimilate leaders of more traditional
groupings: UMNO's co-optation of Anwar, previously leader of
ABIM, is one such illustration.58 It has also, through the machinery of government, employed more authoritarian measures as
was the case in the 1970s when student leaders of ABIM and
other Islamic revival groups were targeted and subject to ISA arrests and detention. In the aftermath of the Reformasi movement this is again true.
PAS' outspoken criticism of the government's treatment of
Anwar and its strong support for Reformasi had positioned PAS
as an "egalitarian party, engaged in mainstream social issues and
55. Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals, 20024 M.LJ. 449. Despite the Federal Court's finding that the arrests and detentions had
been made ultra vires and were unlawful, the Court stopped short of ordering release of
the appellants, constrained by their inability to review detention orders issued by the
Minister under Section 8 of the ISA.

56.

HILLEY,

supra n.1, at 207.

57. Id. at 12.
58. Id.
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receptive to other opposition parties, NGO's and civil organizations."5 9 Despite or because of this new image and the enhanced
reception afforded PAS, UMNO continued to push the line that
PAS represented a fundamentalist conception of Islam, unsuited
to Malaysia's overall objectives of economic growth and development. In elaborating this point, Abdullah Ahmad, then the government's special envoy to the United Nations ("U.N."), stated
that: "[t]he 'Islamic tiger' is as dangerous as the once powerful
'communist tiger' . . . The [N]ation continues to need a strong
leader, otherwise our efforts to rescue the economy could be
stymied by reformasi and the Islamists."6"' During the November
1999 elections, Mahathir vigorously advanced the same position,
depicting PAS as a grouping of devious fanatics, intent on
manipulating the BA in order to advance Islamic goals.6 ' The
strategy aimed not only at scaring the electorate, but also at fomenting division between PAS and its BA allies.
These elections secured UMNO yet another resounding majority in Parliament; yet, the BA obtained more than forty percent of the popular vote, and perhaps, more significantly, PAS
won the state of Terengganu. Its control of two North-Eastern
Peninsula States signalled a powerful endorsement of its Islamic
countervision and provoked the adoption of more coercive strategies on the part of the government in an effort to stem its expansion. In March 2000, PAS' newspaper, HARA-kH, had severe
constraints imposed: restricted from its twice-weekly publication,
it was permitted to publish only twice monthly. Criminal prosecutions were also employed to tighten the screws. That same
year, HARAKAH's editor and printer were arrested and charged
62
under the 1948 Sedition Act.
Government attempts to demonize PAS accelerated in 2001.
Mahathir and an assortment of ministers all sought to present
PAS as fundamentalist and a source of nascent insurgency.6 3
Consistent with this political strategy were the ISA-authorized arrests of ten individuals, all closely associated with PAS. All ten
were reported to be members of an alleged group, the KMM,
59. Id. at 207.
60. As quoted in HILLEY, id.at 208.
61. Id.
62. Id.at 265.
63. See SUARAM REPORT, supra n.18, at 32. Even Singaporean Senior Minister, Lee
Kuan Yew, allegedly expressed his concern at the growing influence of PAS in Malaysia.
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said to be intent on violently toppling the government. Nine
eventually had their sixty day detention periods extended under
two year detention orders. While uncertainty about the group
and its existence was reflected in the media's alternate labelling
of the group - as the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia or the
Kumpulan Militan Malaysia - and by the fact that no group
structures or leadership of the organization had been independently verified, Mahathir nonetheless insisted that the KMM had
formed an alliance with groups in Indonesia and the Philippines
64
aimed at establishing Islamic states in the respective countries.
The Prime Minister's pronouncement came only a week
before September 11. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Malaysian officials were quick to argue that use of the ISA
had been vindicated.6 5 Several more individuals also allegedly
involved in Islamic militancy were arrested and detained under
the ISA in the following months, with little explanation given as
to the reason for their arrests, prompting Human Rights Watch66
to style these measures "opportunism in the face of tragedy.
At present, more than seventy persons allegedly involved with
the KMM and other Islamic militant groups have been arrested
and detained under the ISA.
The congruency of these recent arrests with the government's past attempts to discredit PAS not only raise suspicion
that the threat Malaysia suffers from Islamic extremists, particularly those affiliated with PAS, is exaggerated, but also that some
of these arrests have been effected with the specific aim of further criminalizing PAS in the public's eye. Although not all
those arrested have explicit ties to PAS, these ties, such that they
are, have been repeatedly emphasized ensuring that all the arrests have negatively effected the general public's perception of
PAS.6 7 It should be noted that a number of PAS' policies pre64. Id.
65. Prime Minister Mahathir is reported to have said: "[The ISAI is more necessary
than ever. Even the rich countries, the so-called liberal democracies, have decided that
there is a need for some preventive action to stop people from doing things that are
harmful. People have been detained in other countries now, just as we detain people
because they are a threat to security." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 'WORLD REPORT 2003,
available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/asia.html.
66. Human Rights Watch, Opportunism in the Face of Terror, available at http://www.
hrw.org/campaigns/septemberl 1/opportunismwatch.htm#Malaysia.
67. In June 2002, at UMNO's Annual Assembly, Mahathir insisted that there was a
direct link between PAS and terror networks. See NEW STRAITS TIMES, June 22, 2002.
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sent problems for a government ostensibly committed to ethnic,
cultural and religious plurality and equality. PAS' administration
of Terengganu and Kelantan, and its attempt to implement the
Hudud laws68 raise serious questions about PAS' commitment to
fundamental human rights and civil liberties - particularly those
owed gender and religious minorities. The austerity of its vision
invites speculation that PAS members have had contact with
other groups in the region, seeking the establishment of similar
Islamic States, but by more militant means.6 9 Yet, this in itself is
insufficient to warrant heightened security concerns, and the
government has made no suggestion that it does. Instead, government disclosures supporting the recent arrests have often extended only to assertions of KMM membership and allegations
that some of the detainees had fought in Afghanistan against the
Soviets and attended Pakistani Madrasas, again without any substantial evidence indicating that security concerns are the real
motivation for the arrests.
Nevertheless, genuine concern for security threats must
complicate the assessment of this recent wave of arrests. In the
wake of the Bali bombing, the International Crisis Group has
released a report on the Jemaah Islaamiyah network, suggesting
that Malaysia may, in fact, be the site of certain terrorist activity,
or at least planning.70 The Mahathir-led government, however,
68. The Kelantan Syariah Criminal Code Bill (II) of 1993 lists zina (unlawful sexual intercourse) and irtidad as Hudud offences. Under the evidentiary provisions applicable to zina, a woman alleging rape must produce not less than four witnesses, each of
which "shall be an adult male Muslim who is akil Baligh, and shall be a person who is
just." Should she fail to prove rape, she herself may be found guily of zina, the punishment for which includes "stoning the offender with stones of medium size to death."
The general evidentiary provisions applicable to Hudud offences and those pertaining
specifically to zina, require that all witnesses be adult males and Muslim, evidencing
both religious and gender discrimination. See generally SISTERS IN ISLAM, HUDLUD IN MALAYSIA: THE ISSUES AT STAKE (Rose Ismail ed., 1995).
69. In October 2002, a controversy erupted when the United Nations ("U.N.")
published a report citing "terrorist expert" Rohan Gunaratna's thesis that PAS had links
to Al Qaeda. However, he made this same claim with respect to the ruling Barisan
Nasional and alleged that links had been forged through the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front, operational in southern Philippines. See Anil Netto, Terror Link Shakes Malaysia
Coalition, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 23, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
asia-pacific/2340449.stm. The U.N. has subsequently retracted these allegations.
70. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER: How THEJEMAAH ISLAMIYAH TERRORIST NETWORK OPERATES, ASIA REPORT No. 43 (2002). The Report makes
the following findings, among others:
The top strategists appear to be prothg6s of Abdullah Sungkar, the co-founder
with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, of Pondok Ngruki, a pesantren (a religious boarding
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while using the changed global context to justify increased detentions, has adamantly rejected any suggestion that Malaysia operates as a hub of terrorist operations. 71 Surprisingly, no arrests
have been made in connection with the highly publicized alleged meeting in 2000 of some of the September 11 hijackers in
Kuala Lumpur. The meeting is reported to have brought together Khalid Almihdhar and Nawak Alhazmi, two of the September 11 hijackers, at least one of the suspects in the U.S.S.
Cole attack and Zacarias Massaoui (the alleged 20th hijacker) in
the home of Malaysian, Yazid Sufaat. 72 Yazid Sufaat is currently
detained under the ISA for reportedly ordering four tons of the
explosive, ammonium nitrate, but media investigations contend
that he also arranged the visit to Malaysia of Zacarias Massaoui
and paid him a large sum of money.73 Malaysian officials have
fiercely denied these reports.7 ' This failure by Malaysian authorities to give any credibility to reports that Malaysia might be the
site of internationally directed terrorist activity is curious. So,
too, is its failure to more fully identify the threat posed byJemaah
Islamiyah75 (an organization, unlike the KMM, whose structures
and leadership have been identified), particularly in the context
of the recent arrests and detentions. These failures suggest that
school) in Central Java, mostly Indonesian nationalsliving in Malaysia, and veterans of the anti-Soviet resistance or, more frequently, the post-Soviet period in
Afghanistan ...
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, now under arrest in a police hospital in Jakarta, is the
formal head of Jemaah Islamiyah, but a deep rifhas emerged between him and thefl
leadership in Malaysia, who find him insufficiently radical.
Id. at Executive Summary, i-ii
(emphasis added).
71. In an interview with CNN on May 16, 2002, Mahathir made the following comment:
From what we have discovered they (terrorists) functioned as cells which do
not know what the other cells are doing. I doubt whether they revealed the
things they wanted to do to each other. Each has apparently got its own mission and those in Malaysia were mainly concerned with how to overthrow the
(Malaysian) government.
Transcript available at http://pgoh.free.fr/cnn-interview.html.
72. John Riley, Probes Show Terror's Global Span, NEWSDAY, Dec. 18, 2001.
73. Simon Elegant, Eye of the Storm, TIME ASIA, Feb. 11, 2002.
74. Id. See also Malaysia SuggestsJailed 9/11 Suspect had an Innocent Role, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2002, at Sec. A, at 9. The article reports Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs,
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi stating that Sufaat had been unaware of the identity of those
attending the meeting and of what had been discussed.
75. In the International Crisis Group Report, Sufaat is listed as a senior Jemaah
Islamiyah and is said to be responsible for the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Medan.
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORT, supra n.70, at 36.
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the Malaysian government has at best undertaken an overbroad
sweep of arrests without justifying why so blunt an instrument as
the ISA should be employed. At worst, however, they suggest that
the Malaysian government has used recent tragic events to undercut legitimate political opposition, while downplaying a genuine security threat directed internationally.
Ultimately, whether the recent arrests have been undertaken in bad faith is an open and colorable question. The large
numbers of those arrested and the lack of information makes
any definitive conclusion impossible. Given these circumstances
and a history of the ISA's pretextual use, the government bears a
much greater burden of justifying its actions in a credible and
transparent manner. However, the recent arrests are not disturbing only because those detained may not merit suspicion.
Even in circumstances of valid suspicion, the government must
still make the case for the necessity of resorting to measures like
the ISA. Accordingly, the Malaysian government may be said to
bear a double burden: it is required to show that the recent arrests are not prompted by ulterior motives, and to show that the
emergency measures are necessary. Even in circumstances of
genuine security threat, the presumption of international law is
that individuals must be tried before a public court and their
conditions of detention overseen by accountable authorities not least because without such checks grave abuses of the type
chronicled in the following sections of the Report become commonplace.
D. The ISA and InternationalHuman Rights Law
The second part of the Report documents human rights violations carried out under the ISA and the Report does so primarily through the lens of international human rights law, in an
effort to urge reform.7 6 That said, the Malaysian government's
not infrequent expressions of ambivalence for human rights7 7
76. Although the Report also examines these violations against applicable domestic standards.
77. The government's leading role in the formulation of the Bangkok Declaration,
a regional document circulated prior to the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights
that was critical of the existing human rights regime and called for attention to regional
historical, cultural and religious particularity, demonstrated most notably its ambivalence towards human rights. The Declaration provoked the assertion of an "Asian values" discourse, in contradistinction to "human rights" and in turn has led to an enor-
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and its failure to sign on to many of the most significant human
rights instruments may make this approach appear both ineffective and even unfair. Yet, despite its often truculent position,
Malaysia both believes itself to be, and actively seeks to be, a part
of an international community endorsing and upholding human
rights. As a member of the U.N., it is bound by the Charter's
stated purpose of "promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,"7' 8 and by the protections listed in the UDHR.7" Legislation establishing the Malaysian National Human Rights Commission evidences express
commitment to the provisions of the UDHR, although admittedly in far from unambiguous terms.8" Significantly, the establishment of the Commission itself demonstrates support for
human rights more generally.
Under international law, States are not only obligated to respect those human rights they have undertaken to respect by international agreement; they are also required to respect those
which form part of customary international law and are evidenced by general principles of law common to the major legal
systems of the world.8" Customary international law, established
by the consistent recurrence and repetition of an act (practice or
usus) together with "the mutual conviction that the recurrence
. . .is the result of a compulsory rule" [opinio juris],82 requires
that Malaysia observe human rights protections when they meet
these criteria. At a minimum this includes, among others, the
mous amount of scholarly comment. See generally Karen Engle, Culture and Human
Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 291 (2000);
Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalismand PoliticalCulture: the Debate over Human Rights and
Asian Values, 11 HARV. H.R.J. 109 (1998). For a more recent demonstration of Malaysian officialdom's antipathy for human rights, see the speech given by Prime Minister
Mahathir at the Asian Global Leadership Forum on September 8, 2002, available at
http://www/smpke.jpm.my.
78. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3). See also id. arts. 55-56 (providing for promotion of
similar human rights and freedoms).
79. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. I, Resolutions, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter
UDHR].
80. Act 597 of 1999, supra n.17, Sec. 4(4). Section 4(4) provides: "For the purpose
of this Act, regard shall be had to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 to the
extent that it is not inconsistent with the Constitution." Id. (emphasis added).
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
Sec. 701 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
82. BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (1991).
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prohibitions on torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; and
consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."3 The Report frequently cites human rights
treaties and conventions, not ratified by Malaysia, and other
human rights instruments - such as Declarations and Statements of Principles. It does so to highlight the consistency in
expression of these contemporary pronouncements, evidencing
that the rights have become part of customary international law,
or at the very least, represent emerging norms of international
customary law.
These standards, even if not yet part of customary international law, serve to underline the extent to which Malaysia's State
practice deviates from the practices generally endorsed and upheld by the international community. At intervals, the Report
also makes reference to comparative experience - examining
the practices in comparable jurisdictions - both to underscore
Malaysia's departure from accepted practices, but more importantly, to suggest that States facing similar challenges to Malaysia
have adopted effective measures, that are nonetheless consistent
with human rights.
PART II
A. The Emergency Framework
1. Introduction
Due process is often said to be impossible to guarantee in
periods of national emergency and insistence on its enforcement
may further undermine the security of the State. For these reasons, preventive detention laws are commonly thought justified
during periods of emergency: when the balance requires that
State and public security weigh heavier than rights to freedom
and dignity of the individual. Even in periods of emergency,
however, resort to preventive detention laws should not be the
default position; rather, the State must make a case for the necessity of resorting to measures of this type - as compelled by
the provisions of international law. Nonetheless, Malaysia continues to enforce the ISA, notwithstanding the absence of any iden83.

RESTATEMENT,

supra n.81, Sec. 702.
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tifiable emergency or even any colorable claims by the government that such circumstances pertain.
This section first elaborates the justificatory framework for
preventive detention laws sanctioned under international law namely, periods of verifiable emergency. It then looks to Malaysian domestic law and its own restricted authorization for preventive detention laws. Thereafter, the section examines the extent to which the ISA and its current deployment fail to meet
justificatory thresholds elaborated under these international and
domestic law regimes. The section concludes with applicable
findings and recommendations of the mission.
2. Malaysia's Human Rights Obligations
a. International Law Provisions
International human rights instruments have been drafted
carefully to allow for sufficient flexibility and derogation in times
of need. The UDHR, applicable to Malaysia by virtue of its status
as a U.N. Member State, is the archetype. Its protections include
the individual's right to liberty, 4 to effective remedy for acts violating fundamental rights, 5 and to a "fair and public hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of
his rights."8' 6 The UDHR, nonetheless, also makes provision for
circumstances in which rights might be abrogated, providing in
Article 29(2) that:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting
the just requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare in the democratic society.
The Article serves as a precursor to the more specific derogation
regimes and limitations clauses included in subsequent human
rights conventions, most notably the ICCPR.8 7 Intended as an
elaboration of the rights inscribed in the UDHR, the ICCPR has
met with such consistent endorsement and compliance that
84. UDHR, supra n.79, art. 3.
85. Id. art. 8.
86. Id. art. 10.
87. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. G.A. Res. 2200 A
(xxi), 999 U.N.T.S. at 171 & 1057 U.N.T.S. at 407 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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many of its provisions are now said to reflect customary international law.8 8 Article 4 of the ICCPR provides for derogation in
times of "public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed."8 9 Such
measures must be "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation," not prove "inconsistent with other obligations under international law," and must "not involve discrimination solely on
the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin."90 In addition, States Parties to the ICCPR wishing to avail
themselves of the right to derogation must provide notice to the
U.N. Secretary-General of the provisions from which it has derogated and the reasons therefore, and must further communicate
the date at which derogation is terminated.9 The exacting demands of derogation are intended to guard against disingenuous suspensions of rights. Enhanced protection is further provided by the fact that derogation is not permitted from certain
Articles - the so-called non-derogable rights.9 2 Articles 993 and
88. See General Comment No. 24, U.N. GAOR Human Rights Committee, 52d Session, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Revl/Add 6, (1994).
89. ICCPR, supra n.87.
90. ICCPR, supra n.87, art. 4(1).
91. ICCPR, supra n.87, art. 4(3).
92. These include Article 6: inherent right to life; Article 7: freedom from torture,
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; Article 8 (paras. I and 2): freedom from slavery and servitude; and Articles 11, 15, 16 and 18.
93. ICCPR, supra n.87, art. 9. Article 9 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are
established by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought
promptly before ajudge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It
shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in
custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any
other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled
to take proceedings before a court, in order that court may decide without
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention
is not lawful.
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have
an enforceable right to compensation.
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prohibiting preventive detention laws like the ISA, how-

95
ever, are not among these non-derogable rights.

b. Domestic Law
Part II of Malaysia's Federal Constitution enshrines several
fundamental rights, but like international instruments, it too
provides for derogation. Article 149 of the Constitution authorizes the enactment of legislation targeting subversion and other
action prejudicial to the public order and which is valid notwithstanding its inconsistency with certain fundamental rights in the
Constitution. In order to be lawfully enacted pursuant to Article
149, an Act of Parliament need only recite that "action has been
taken or threatened by a substantial number of persons" intended to realize certain prohibited purposes and ends elaborated in Article 149.96 The rights, from which derogation is expressly contemplated, include the right to liberty of the per94. Id. art. 10. Article 10 provides:
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated
from convicted persons and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate
to their status as unconvicted persons;
(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as
speedily as possible for adjudication.
3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential
aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal status.
Id.
95. Article 4 of the ICCPR mirrors the delegation clause included in Article 15 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter
ECHR], which also makes provision for certain non-derogable rights. Limitation of
rights is also provided for in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (Article 27(2)) [hereinafter African
Charter], and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted by
the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota (1948) (Article
XXVIII) [hereinafter American Declaration]; yet, these resemble the general limitations clause of the UDHR and do not exempt certain non-derogable rights.
96. The following ends and purposes are prohibited Linder MALAY. CONSTI., art.
149:
Action "taken or threatened by any substantial body of persons, whether inside
or outside the Federation(a) to cause, or to cause a substantial number of citizens to fear organized
violence against persons or property; or
(b) to excite disaffection against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or any Government in the Federation; or
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son;9 7 prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement; 9"
freedom of speech, assembly and association; 9 and rights to
property.10 0
However, Article 151 of the Constitution prescribes certain
restrictions on preventive detention, requiring that legislation
passed under Article 149, although entailing abridgements to
the right to liberty, nonetheless continue to observe certain core
protections. These protections include disclosure to the detainee -

as soon as may be -

of the grounds of his detention

and allegations of fact on which the order is based, and affording him the opportunity to make representations against the order as soon as may be.' 0 ' The manner in which representations
are to be made is also elaborated: detainees make representations before an advisory board which must consider and issue
recommendations to the Malaysian king, the Yang di-Pertuan
Agong, within three months' of receiving such representations,
failing which the detention becomes unlawful. Significantly, the
Article, while granting the right of disclosure, also renders it illusory in several respects. Article 151 (3) does not "require any authority to disclose facts whose disclosure would in its opinion be
against the national interest."
These constitutional provisions provide the framework
within which the ISA was enacted. Although Article 149-authorized legislation must clearly be addressed to a substantial threat,
this legislation, including the ISA, is not dependent for its validity upon the declaration of any formal state of emergency.
(c) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or
other classes of the population likely to cause violence; or
(d) to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of anything
by law established; or
(e) which is prejudicial to the maintenance or the functioning of any supply or service to the public or any class of the public in the Federation or any
part thereof; or
(f) which is prejudicial to the public order in, or the security of, the Federation or any part thereof...
Id.
97. Id. art. 5.
98. Id. art. 9.
99. Id. art. 10.
100. Id. art. 13.
101. Id. art. 151 (1)(a).
102. Or for such longer period as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may allow. See id. art.
151 (1) (b).
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There have, in fact, been several states of emergency declared in
the course of Malaysia's independence and the last has never
been expressly revoked.
The preamble to the ISA states that the Act was intended to
provide "for the internal security of Malaysia, preventive detention, the prevention of subversion, the suppression of organized
violence against persons and property in specified areas of Malaysia, and for matters incidental thereto." It goes on to recite
that:
action has been taken and further action is threatened by a
substantial body of persons both inside and outside Malaysia
(1) to cause, and to cause a substantial number of citizens to
fear, organised violence against persons and property; and
(2) to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means,
of the lawful Government of Malaysia by law established," and
that "the action taken and threatened is prejudicial to the security of Malaysia.
The Preamble thus expressly employs the language of subclauses
(a), (d), and (f) of Article 149 of the Constitution and after asserting that "Parliament considers it necessary to stop or prevent
that action," affirms that the law is enacted "pursuant to Article
149 of the Constitution."
3. Problems
As previously discussed, subclause (1) of Article 149 requires that legislation enacted pursuant to its provisions must recite that "action has been taken or threatened by any substantial
body of persons" and proceeds to enumerate in (a) through (f)
the prohibited action or threat.1 °3 A close reading of this Article
makes obvious the requirements that the action taken or the
threat made must already have taken place, i.e. have occurred, in
the past-tense; that it must be both specific and identifiable; and
that a substantial body of persons must be behind the action or
threat. Manifestly, Article 149 does not authorize catch-all or
omnibus-type legislation - that is, legislation designed to target
any threat whatsoever, even those not yet materialized and which
the Parliament could not yet have considered.
This understanding reflects the circumstances under which
103. See n.96 and accompanying text.
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the ISA was enacted. The twelve-year emergency declared by
British authorities in 1948 in response to the Communist insurgency was suspended in 1960 by the new Malaysian government.
Preventive detention powers embodied in Regulation 17 of the
Emergency Regulations 1948 were, with the repeal of the Regulations, inserted in the ISA - plainly demonstrating a continuity
of purpose." 4 The Parliamentary debates in the Dewan Rakyat
(the Malaysian Parliament), which took place at the time of the
Bill's passage, further reflect that the ISA was enacted for the
purpose of fighting the Communist insurgency and that it was
intended as a temporary measure until the threat was rem ove d. 105

That Article 149 continues to be understood as only providing for the passage of extraordinary laws in cases of specific,
identifiable threat, is reflected in the comparatively recent enact-

ment of the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act
1985. The Act, as made clear in its Preamble, is intended to provide for "the preventive detention of persons associated with any
activity relating to or involving the trafficking in dangerous

drugs." Both a specific act or threat and an identifiable body of
persons are set forth - namely, drug trafficking and drug traffickers.
So far, Malaysian courts have dismissed arguments challenging the validity of the ISA on the basis that it is ultra vires, or
exceeds the scope of Article 149. In Theresa Lim Chin Chin Ors v.
Inspector General of Police," 6 the Federal Court was asked to find
104. Karam Singh v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1969] 2 M.L.J.
129 [Jld 2/11], 140.
105. In response to the opposition's stated fears that the ISA would be used to
target legitimate political opposition, various government officials publicly stated that
the ISA was intended only to fight militant Communism. The Minister of Finance (Enche Tan Siew Sin) explained: "For the past 12 years, we have been waging a bitter, long,
costly and bloody struggle against militant Communism and terrorism." Memorandum
from the Bar Council Malaysia on the Repeal of Laws Relating to Detention Without
Trial 108. Additionally, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence (Tun Abdul
Razak) stated:
As Honourable Members are aware, although armed terrorism is coming to an
end, the communists are endeavouring to achieve by subversive means what
they have failed by force of arms, and it is the intention of the communists to
overthrow the democratic Government of this country by subversive means.
Therefore, it is essential that we should have a law dealing with subversion.
Id. at 120.
106. 1988-1 M.L.1. 293.
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that Article 149(1) limits the application of the ISA only to Communist insurgency and subversion - a request the Court denied
in perfunctory fashion. 1117 In a more recent challenge, lawyers
for the KeADILan detainees made the same argument, which
was again rejected."1 8 The Federal Court held that "the purpose
of the ISA is for all forms of subversion but was more directed to
communist activities which was [sic] prevailing at the time the
law was enacted." 10 9
These decisions offer no persuasive reasoning for why Article 149 should be read contrary to its express provisions and,
indeed, contrary to the statements of Tunku Abdul Rahman,
first Prime Minister of Malaysia who insisted that "[t] he Internal
Security Act was designed and meant to be used solely against
the Communists and their allies in order to finally overcome and
prevent a repetition of the Communist insurgency and subversion."' ° Even assuming that the Federal Court's conclusion is
justifiable, international standards, nonetheless, pertain. The
UDHR allows a limitation of rights and freedoms where these
meet the requirements of public order. In the case of the ISA,
however, there is no mere limitation on an individual's right to
liberty or to take proceedings before a court - but wholesale
deprivation.
In addition, the Malaysian government has failed to assert
that the ISA has been tailored to the just requirements of public
order, or necessitated by public emergency, which threatens the
life of the Nation, as required by the ICCPR. Although the delegation was refused interviews with government officials, the Deputy Chairman of SUHAKAM, Tan Sri Dato'Harun Mahmud
Hashim, explained to members of the mission that the Commission, even post September 11, was not "fully satisfied that there is

107. Id. "The expression 'that action' in our review has no consequence to determine or limit the scope of the Act. The Act is valid and from the wording of the provision of the Act there is nothing to show that it is restricted to communist activities." Id.
108. Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals,
supra n.55.
109. Id. Judgment of Justice Abdul Malek Ahmad.
110. Aft. of Tunku Abdul Rahman Alhaj ibni Al-marhum Sultan Abdul Hamid
Halimshah, filed in support of a habeas corpus application before the Criminal Division
of the High Court at Kuala Lumpur on behalf of Dr. Chandra Muzaffar. See Memorandum from the Malaysian Bar Council, supra n.12.
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a real security threat to justify the ISA."' " In fact, the government has been so adamant in insisting that there is scant threat
to public order and national security that some of the most recent ISA arrests and detentions have ironically been directed at
persons allegedly responsible for spreading false information
about impending terrorist attacks on Kuala Lumpur.' 1 2 While
the mission concedes that there may well be circumstances of
exceptional security threat in which extraordinary measures are
required, in such circumstances the burden falls on the government to show the necessity of deploying the extraordinary measures, i.e. detention without trial laws. In the case of Malaysia
with its history of ISA abuse, the government incurs a double
burden - not only of justifying the necessity of the ISA, but also
of demonstrating that the particular arrests are not motivated by
ulterior purposes.
4. Recommendations
The Report records throughout recommendations that, if
implemented, would serve to ameliorate the egregious workings
of the ISA. These recommendations should not imply any equivocation on the delegation's part - that it departed from Malaysia believing that the ISA should be retained, but reformed. The
mission's position, fundamentally, is that the ISA should be abolished, but in the absence of this outcome, second-best measures
could involve reform. Nonetheless, it is fitting that this first section should contain only one recommendation: that the ISA be
repealed in its entirety. Absent a justificatory framework - any
credible claim that threats to public order or national security
necessitate the denial of the right to liberty - there can be no
basis for the continued existence of the ISA.
B. Probable Cause/ReasonableSuspicion
1. Introduction
It is a fundamental premise of almost all criminal justice systems that arrest and the consequent deprivation of liberty can
only be carried out where probable cause exists to support such
arrest - in other words, that the person arrested is reasonably
IIL Interview with Tan Sri Dato'Harun Mahmud Hashim, Deputy Chairman of
SUHAKAM (June 10, 2002).
112. Aliran Press Statement, Dec. 21, 2002.
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suspected of having committed a proscribed act or, and especially in the case of preventive detentions, is reasonably suspected of being likely to commit the proscribed act. Even assuming that times of emergency may act to qualify the reasonableness of the suspicion, a degree of suspicion is nonetheless
required to trigger the authority to make arrests. Without reasonable suspicion, arrests simply become a tool for persecution
- a means of targeting individuals for unlawful, spurious purposes. 13
The ISA, as currently formulated, does not permit arbitrary
arrests and detention of this type. Section 73 specifically requires that police officers make arrests only in respect of persons
they have "reason to believe"' 1 4 have acted in the proscribed
fashion and Section 8 requires that the Minister "is satisfied""' 5
that the detentions are effected with a view to preventing the
detainee from acting in the proscribed fashion. Nonetheless, arrests and detentions under the ISA have been consistently undertaken in violation of these provisions. This section first describes international standards prohibiting arbitrary arrests and
113. See Steven Greer, Preventive Detention and Public Security - Towards a General
Model, in PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND SECURITY LAW: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 36 (Andrew Harding &John Hatchard eds., 1993).
114. See ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 73. Section 73 of the ISA provides that:
(1) Any police officer may without warrant arrest and detain pending enquiries any person in respect of whom he has reason to believe (c) that there are grounds which would justify his detention under section
8; and
(d) that he has acted or is about to act or is likely to act in any manner
prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof.
(2) Any police officer may without warrant arrest and detain pending enquiries any person, who upon being questioned by the officer fails to satisfy the
officer as to his identity or a to the purposes for which he is in the place where
he is found and who the officer suspects has acted or is about to act in any
manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the
maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof.
Id.
115. See ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 8(1). Section 8(1) of the ISA provides:
If the Minister is satisfied that the detention of any person is necessary with a
view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security
of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services
therein or to the economic life thereof, he may make an order (hereinafter
referred to as a detention order) directing that that person be detained for
any period not exceeding two years.
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detentions. It then examines Malaysian domestic law and the

protections provided against abuse of this kind. Finally, the section documents patterns and procedures of arrest, detention
and interrogation that reflect the absence of reasonable suspi-

cion and establish violation of international law.
2. Malaysia's Human Rights Obligations
a. International Human Rights Norms
Numerous international human rights instruments reflect a
global consensus against arbitrary arrest and detention.' 6 So

widespread and consistent is this consensus, both in doctrine
and in practice, that the bar on arbitrary arrest and detention is
accepted as settled customary international law." 7 Article 2 of
the UDHR provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention."' " Article 9(1) of the ICCPR reiterates this protection and Article 9(2) guarantees that " [a]nyone
who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the

reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any
charges against him.""' 9 The U.N. General Assembly has articulated the core, non-derogable protections availing persons
under any form of detention or imprisonment in the Body of
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment ("Body of Principles").1210 Principle
10 guarantees that persons arrested shall be informed at the
116. Article 6 of the African Charter, supra n.95 provides that "no one may be
arbitrarily arrested and detained." Id. See also American Convention on Human Rights
July 18, 1978, art. 7, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (inscribing the same protection and guarantees
the right to be informed of the reasons for detention and of prompt notification of the
charge or charges); see also Article 5 of the ECHR, supra n.95 (guaranteeing analogous
protections).
It should be noted that the international requirement that arrest and detention be nonarbitrary is not met by averring simply that arrest and detention have been carried out
under the color of law - i.e. those responsible for the arrest and detention were authorized to do so under law.
Were this the case, there would be no reason to provide, as do most international instruments in this regard, not only that arbitrary arrest and detention is proscribed, but
also that persons shall not be deprived of their liberty save on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedures as are established by law. The requirement of nonarbitrary arrest and detention is thus deeper, and compels that there be reasonable
grounds to trigger the workings of the law.
117. See REST[ATEMENT, supra n.81, Sec. 702.

118. UDHR, supra n.79, art. 2.
119. ICCPR, supra n.87, art. 9(1).
120. Adopted by G.A. Res. 43/173 of Dec. 9, 1988.
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time of their arrest of the reasons for their arrest and shall be
promptly informed of any charges against them. 2 1 Principle 12
requires that there be due record of the arrest and that such
records "shall be communicated to the detained person, or his
counsel, if any, in the form prescribed by law."' 2 2 The Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners similarly reflects
a concern that all persons arrested and detained shall have the
reasons for their detention and the authority therefore publicly
23
recorded.1
b. Domestic Law
Article 5(3) of the Malaysian Constitution, guaranteeing
"liberty of the person," entitles all persons arrested to the right
to be informed of the grounds of their arrest, 24 presupposing
that some lawful grounds for the arrest must exist. Subsection
(5), however, makes clear that this right, together with the right
to be produced before a magistrate without unreasonable delay, 125 does not apply to enemy aliens. 126 No other categories of
persons are similarly excluded, 2 7 providing further textual evidence that individuals arrested and detained under the ISA are
also guaranteed the right to be informed of the grounds for
their arrest.
Article 149 of the Constitution, authorizing legislation
against, among other things, subversion, and action prejudicial
to public order, does provide that the rights guaranteed under
Article 5 may be lawfully restricted - but only to the extent that
provisions of Article 149-authorized legislation itself are inconsistent with these rights. For example, Section 73 of the ISA allows
for detention of more than twenty-four hours without the order
of a magistrate and is, on its face, contrary to Article 5(4) of the
Constitution. 1 28 Yet, it remains valid law, given the stipulations
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 6/1 at 67(1956).
124. MALAY. CONST., art. 5(3). Article 5(3) provides: "Where a person is arrested
he shall be informed as soon as may be of the grounds for his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice." Id.
125. MALAY. CONST., art. 5(4).
126. MALAY. CONST., art. 5(4).
127. With respect to article 5(3).
128. MALAY. CONST., art. 5(4). Article 5(4) provides:
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of Article 149, where otherwise it would be void for being inconsistent with Article 5(4) and accordingly unconstitutional. 29 In
this instance, there is no provision in the ISA that provides that
persons arrested shall be denied information as to the grounds
for their arrest - a provision that would be inconsistent with Article 5(3)'s requirement that persons arrested shall be informed
as soon as may be. It follows, therefore, that those subject to
arrests and detentions under the ISA may still avail themselves of
these constitutional protections.
Supporting this conclusion are the requirements in the ISA
that the Minister's order of detention shall be served on the person to whom it relates "as soon as may be after the making
thereof" 3 and shall be accompanied by a statement in writing
furnished by the Minister setting out the "grounds on which the
order is made" ' and the "allegations of fact on which the order
is based."' 3 2 While there are no similarly express provisions relating to initial arrests and detentions carried out by police authorities under Section 73 of the ISA, the absence of such provisions does not excuse the police authorities' failure to provide
grounds for the arrest and detention, and certainly does not allow for these arrests and detentions to be "groundless." Section
73 (3) requires that at prescribed intervals during the initial sixtyday detention, the approval of increasingly senior authorities
must be attained if detention is to continue 133 - a procedure
Where a person is arrested and not released he shall without unreasonable
delay, and in any case within twenty-four hours (excluding the time of any
necessary journey) be produced before a magistrate and shall not be further
detained in custody without the magistrate's authority.
Id.
129. This reasoning is drawn from the legal arguments submitted by the appellants
in Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals, Outline of
Arguments for the Appellants 64, para. 4.7 (on file with the Crowley Program).
130. ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 11(1).
131. ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 1 l(2) (b)(i).
132. ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 11 (2) (b) (ii).
133. ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 73(3). Section 73(3) provides:
Any person arrested under this section may be detained for a period not exceeding sixty days without an order of detention having been made in respect
of him under [S]ection 8:
Provided that (d) he shall not be detained for longer than twenty-four hours except with the
authority of a police officer of or above the rank of Inspector;
(e) he shall not be detained for more than forty-eight hours except with the
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that can only make sense if construed to ensure that continued
detention is merited and based on valid grounds.
Finally, as has already been asserted, police officers carrying
out arrests and detentions under Section 73 must have "reason
to believe" that there exist grounds that would justify the individual's arrest under Section 8 and that "he has acted or is about to
act or is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of
Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential
services or to the economic life thereof."1" 4 The phrase "reason
to believe" has considerable weight. This is shown by comparison with the following subsection authorizing police officers to
make arrests and effect detentions in respect of those persons
"who upon being questioned by the officer fails to satisfy the officer as to his identity or as to the purposes for which he is in the
place where he is found. '135 In these circumstances, the police
officer need only "suspect" that the person "has acted or is about
to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or
any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services
therein or to the economic life thereof." 136 In respect of the
Minister when exercising his powers authorized under Section 8,
he must be satisfied that the detention of the person is necessary
with a view to preventing him from acting in the prohibited
manner.' 3 7 All these provisions make plain that the ISA, however excessive in its reach and impact, nonetheless contains safeguards against arbitrary arrests and detentions. As the following
section illustrates, in practice these safeguards are almost only
ever observed in the breach.
3. Violations
The extent to which arbitrary arrests and detentions are efauthority of a police officer of or above the rank of Assistant Superintendent;
and
(f) he shall not be detained for more than thirty days unless a police officer of
or above the rank of Deputy Superintendent has reported the circumstances
of the arrest and detention to the Inspector-General or to a police officer designated by the inspector-General in that behalf, who shall forthwith report the
same to the Minister.
Id.
134.
135.
136.
137.

ISA,
ISA,
ISA,
ISA,

supra n.5,
supra n.5,
supra n.5,
supra n.5,

Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.

73(1).
73(2).
73(2).
8(l).
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fected under provisions of the ISA is most vividly illustrated by
reference to the circumstances surrounding the arrest and detention of ten individuals in April 2001, all associated with the
political party, KeADILan - hence the collective term, "the
KeADILan 10." These circumstances are comprehensively docu-

mented in affidavits submitted by all ten to the Malaysian Federal Court, and accepted by the Court as authentic accounts. 1 8
At the time of their respective arrests - all in different locations and at different times 3 9 - none of the individuals was informed as to the reason for his arrest and subsequent detention.14 However, at a press conference on April 11, 2001, the
Inspector General of Police, Tan Sri Norian Mai, released a statement alleging that the arrests of the initial seven on April 10,
2001 had been triggered by concerns for national security. His
statement gave examples of their purported military activities, including efforts to obtain explosive materials, such as bombs and
138. See Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals,
2002-4 M.L.J. 449. Judge Dzaidden made the following finding:
[D]espite the press statement of the respondent that the appellants were detained because they were a threat to national security, it is surprising to note
from the appellants' affidavits that they were not interrogated on the militant
actions and neither were they questioned about getting explosive materials
and weapons. Clearly, . . . the questions that were asked were more on the
appellants' political activities and for intelligence gathering. I find that there
is much force in the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the
detentions were for an ulterior purpose and unconnected with national security.
Id.
139. Abdul Ghani bin Haroon, arrested on April 11, 2001 at Kuching Airport. See
Aft. of Abdul Ghani bin Haroon. Badaruddin Bin Ismail, arrested on April 26, 2001 at
Taman Melawati. See Aff. of Badaruddin Bin Ismail. Badrulamin Bin Bahron, arrested
on April 20, 2001 at his home. See Aff. of Badrulamin Bin Bahron. Chua Tian Chang,
arrested on April 10, 2001 at his office. See Aff. of Chua Tian Chang. Gobalakrishnan
a/I Nagappan, arrested on April 10, 2001 at Langkawi. See Aff. of Gobalakrishnan a/I
Nagappan. Hishamuddin Bin Md Rais, arrested on April 10, 2001 at his office. See Aft.
of Hishamuddin Bin Md Rais. Lokman Noor Bin Adam, arrested on April 13, 2001
while leaving the PAS office at Shah Alam. See Aff. of Lokman Noor Bin Adam.
Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Nor, arrested on April 10, 2001 at Subang Airport. See Aft.
of Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Nor. Raja Petra Bin Raja Kamarudin, arrested on April
11, 2001 at Damansara Road. See Aft. of Raja Petra Bin Raja Kamarudin. Saari bin
Sungib, arrested on April 10, 2001 at his house. See Aff. of Saari bin Sungib.
140. See Affs. of Abdul Ghani bin Haroon, Badrulamin Bin Bahron, Chua Tian
Chang, Gobalakrishnan a/I Nagappan, Hishamuddin Bin Md Rais, Lokman Noor Bin
Adam, Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Nor, Saari bin Sungib. Badaruddin Bin Ismail, and
Raja Patra Bin Raja Kamarudin, supra n.140. These individuals were informed that they
were arrested under Section 73 of the ISA, as they constituted threats to national security. No reasons were given for such an assessment.
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grenade launchers; the use of Molotov cocktails, ball bearings,
and other dangerous weapons to attack security personnel during street demonstrations in October 1998; obtaining the assistance and support of martial arts experts; and attempting to influence former security officers and personnel.1 4 ' Given the
proximity of the subsequent three arrests made later in April' 14 2
to those made on April 10 and 11 and the personal and professional contacts between all ten, through the workings of KeADILan and other aligned civic bodies, it must be fairly concluded
that the Inspector General of Police's media statement implicated all ten and was the purported reason for all of the arrests.
Yet, in none of the interrogations endured by the ten detainees, were they ever asked about alleged military activities. No
mention was made of attempts to acquire explosive materials
and weapons. 43 Instead, they were asked about their political
activities and involvement, the funding they received for these
activities, and the sources of this funding.' 4 4 Those responsible
for the interrogation appeared particularly anxious to establish
whether these sources of funding were foreign, 14 5 at times accus141. Aff. of Badrulamin Bin Bahron, supra n.140, at para. 39; Aff. of Hishamuddin
Bin Md Rais, supra n.140, at 15, para. 29; Aff. of Lokman Noor Bin Adam, supra n.140,
at 7, para. 23; Af. of Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Nor, supra n.140, at 5, para. 16; and
Aff. of Saari bin Sungib, supra n.140, at 17, para. 32.
142. Badaruddin Bin Ismail, arrested on April 26, 2001; Badrulamin Bin Bahron,
arrested on April 20, 2001; Lokman Noor Bin Adam, arrested on April 13, 2001.
143. See especially Aff. of Badaruddin Bin Ismail, supra n. 140, at para. 12: "I categorically state that I was never questioned or interrogated on any alleged militant groups or
militant activities, in particular, on alleged explosives such as bombs, ball bearings, Molotov cocktails and grenade launchers." Id. Aft. of Saari bin Sungib, supra n.140, at 17,
para. 32: "Throughout the period of my detention, I was not asked at all about the
allegations on trying to get explosive materials and weapons." Id. Aff. of Hishamuddin
Bin Md Rais, supra n.140, at para. 31: "I was never asked about these accusations [made
by the Inspector General of Police] . . .They (the police) have also never asked any
detailed questions to show the relationship between myself and the unfounded allegations." Id. Aff. of Raja Petra Bin Raja Kamarudin, supra n.140, at para. 27: "Throughout the period of detention I was not asked at all about the allegations of trying to get
explosive material and weapons." Id. See also Interviews with Raja PetraBin Raje
Kamarudin, Gobalkrishnan a/I Nagappan, Badaruddin Bin Ismail (June 2, 2002).
144. Aft. of Abdul Ghani bin Haroon, supra n.140, at para 35(15),(16); Aft. of
Badaruddin Bin Ismail, supra n.140, at para. 11 (c), (d), (h), (i), and (j); Aff. of Badrulamin Bin Bahron, supra n.140, at para. 43, 45, 46; Aft. of Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd
Nor, supra n.140, at paras. 18-29; 33-39; Aft. of Lokman Noor Bin Adam, supra n.140,
at para. 31; Aff. of Hishamuddin Bin Md Rais, supra n.140, at para. 17; Aft. of Chua
Tian Chang, supra n.140, at para. 19(h), (m), and (n); and Aff. of Raja Petra Bin Raja
Kamarudin, supra n.140, at para. 20.
145. Aff. of Abdul Ghani bin Haroon, supra n.140, at para. 35(13)-(14).
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ing the detainees of connection to the CIA, and in the case of
Hishamuddin Bin Rais, of being "Al Gore's stooge." 146
In addition, interrogating officers asked the detainees about
their relationships to and knowledge of a particular set of individuals - among them, Wan Azizah, Anwar Ibrahim and Chandra Muzaffar. 4' 7 During the course of the interrogations, the po-

lice officers explicitly described former Deputy Prime Minister
Anwar Ibrahim's alleged sexual proclivities, and promised to
provide photographic and other documentation of this alleged
activity.14 8 A consistent theme in all the interrogations was the
lewd, disturbing interest evidenced by the interrogators in respect of completely unrelated sexual matters. A number of the
detainees were accused of involvement in extra-marital affairs, 14 9
and were asked questions of a sexually graphic nature.1 0
The prurient nature of the questioning to which the detainees were subjected cannot be dismissed as an unfortunate function of ill-disciplined, unprofessional police conduct. These pervasive themes of the interrogations suggest a coordinated effort
on the part of the authorities. More gravely, the nature of the
interrogations confirms that the arrests and detentions were unsupported by reasonable suspicion, or any suspicion at all, on
the part of the police officers of involvement or likely involvement in conduct prejudicial to Malaysia's security, essential services, or economic life. The interrogations, instead, amounted
to exercises in information gathering, in which the police had
no expectation of eliciting information relating to security
threats, but rather, sought to learn about the structure of the
146. Aff. of Hishamuddin Bin Rais, supra n.140, at 6, para. 15.
147. Aff. of Abdul Ghani bin Haroon, supra n.140, at para. 35.17, 35.18, 35.19,
35.20, and 35.21; Aff. of Badaruddin Bin Ismail, supra n. 140, at para. 11 (b), (e); Aff. of
Badrulamin Bin Bahron, supra n.140, at para. 50; Aff. of Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd
Nor, supra n.140, at 11, para. 30; Aff. of Saari bin Sungib, supra n.140, at 16, para. 31;
Aff. of Hishamuddin Bin Md Rais, supra n.140, at para. 19; Aff. of Chua Tian Chang,
supra n.140, at para. 19(b), (f), and (q); Aff. of Raja Petra Bin Raja Kamarudin, supra
n.139, at paras. 21 and 22.
148. Aft. of Abdul Ghani bin Haroon, supra n.140, at para. 35.17.3; Aff. of
Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Nor, supra n.140, at 15, para. 40; Aff. of Chua Tian Chang,
supra n.140. at para. 19(b); Aff. of Badrulamin Bin Bahron, supra n.140, at para. 50; and
Aft. of Raja Petra Bin Raja Kamarudin, supra n.140, at para. 23.
149. Aff. of Badaruddin Bin Ismail, supra n.140, at para. 11(b); Aff. of Lokman
Noor Bin Adam, supra n.140, at para. 32; Af'. of Hishamuddin Bin Md Rais, supra n.140,
at para. 21; and Aff. of Raja Petra Bin Raja Kamarudin, supra n.140, at para. 23
150. Aff. of Hishamuddin Bin Md Rais, supra n.140, at paras. 15, 22.
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political opposition, its support, and leadership. The character
of the interrogations further negates any conclusion that the
Minister could be genuinely satisfied that those who were detained subsequent to the end of the initial sixty-day period, by an
order issued pursuant to Section 8, posed a threat to the national security of Malaysia, its essential services, or the economic
life thereof. None of the questions asked during the interrogations was aimed at soliciting information that might support
such a conclusion. Without this information, there can be no
bona fide claim that the Minister was, in fact, satisfied that their
continued detention was necessary. Instead, the process reinforces the perception that the ISA is consistently employed to
persecute legitimate political opposition.
The detainees appealed the denial of their habeas petitions
and a ruling, in respect of five of the ten, was issued by the Federal Court on September 6, 2002.51 Relying upon the appellants' affidavits - their disclosure of the nature of the questioning they endured during the initial sixty-day detention - the
Federal Court concluded that the initial arrests and detentions
were mala fides and unlawful. Unable to exercise review of the
Minister's decision, given the express judicial ouster in this regard, the Court did not make the corollary finding: that the ini1 2
tial unlawfulness tainted the subsequent Ministerial detention. 1
The detainees thus remain in detention, but the judgment,
nonetheless, stands as a significant exposure of police abuse of
the ISA and substantially erodes claims to the ISA's necessity.
Not surprisingly, the decision has provoked the government's ire. Suggesting that the abuse is not a matter of isolated
police misconduct but represents part of a systematic campaign
originating from within the highest levels, the Malaysian government has responded to the Federal Court's ruling by threatening
to amend the law. The threatened amendments include the
proposal that police no longer be required to defend detentions
in court, that no negative inferences may be drawn from their
151. Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals,
2002-4 M.L.J. 449.
152. Id. The Court, in fact treated the Minister's order as a separate matter: "[A]s
the appellants have now been detained by order of the Minister under S.8 of the Act,
the issue of whether or not to grant the writ of habeas corpus for their release from
current detention does not concern us. That is a matter of a different exercise." Judgment of Justice Steve Shim Lip Kiong, Chief Judge Sabah & Sarawak.
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decision not to do so, and a second proposal that detainees held
under the ISA be prohibited from divulging any details of their
interrogations to the courts.1 5 1 Should these proposed amendments be realized, habeas corpus applications, already strictly curtailed, will be all but impossible.
It should also be noted that a number of the detainees were
informed at the very beginning of their detention periods that
they would be detained for the full sixty days.' 54 This practice is
at odds with the authorized procedure whereby continued detention under Section 73 is subject to the approval of more senior police authorities,15 5 a procedure evidently designed to ensure that detention is continued only if necessary. In making
clear at the outset that they had no intention of adhering to the
legal provisions, the police officers demonstrated that the purpose of the arrests and detentions was not the legitimate one of
attempting to ascertain whether, in fact, the detainee posed a
security threat and thereafter conditioning continued detention
on the necessity of ascertaining further information. In other
words, detention for the full sixty days was the result, even if the
police were satisfied after five days that the individual was not
about to act or likely to act in any of the prohibited ways, underscoring the extent to which the police officers eschewed reasonable suspicion, required by both international and domestic provisions, as justification at every stage of the detention.
4. Recommendations
1. First and foremost, no amendment to the ISA along the lines
currently proposed by the government should be passed. If such
153. See

REPORT BY THE OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DE-

FENDERS, MALAYSIA: "THE BOA CONSTRICTOR": SILENCING HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

12

2003. See alsoJonathan Kent, Malaysia to Tighten Security Laws, BBC, Nov. 12, 2002, at
http://www.suaram/org/isa/news20021112.htm; Suaram Press Statement, Proposed
Amendments of ISA Perpetuate Further Injustices (Oct. 8, 2002), available at http://
www.suaram.org/pressrelease/pr20021008.htm. The proposed amendments appear
to be direct responses to the Federal Courtjudgment's criticism in Mohamad Ezam bin
Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals, supra n.55, of the respondent's
conduct: "A thorough perusal of the affidavits filed by the respondents find them to
contain nothing more than bare denials in response to the allegations contained in the
affidavits affirmed by the respective appellants." Judgment of Justice Steve Shim Lip
Kiong, Chief Judge Sabah & Sarawak.
154. Interview with Gobalakrishnan a/I Nagappan, Badaruddin Bin Ismail, ISA detainees (June 3, 2002).
155. See ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 73(3).
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an amendment is passed, applications for judicial review, already
rarely successful, will be all but impossible.
2. Review at staggered intervals of the detention must be undertaken to establish the continued necessity of detention. Review
procedures should be conducted by judicial authorities, such as
magistrates, independent of the police.
3. In keeping with the Body of Principles, due record shall be
made of the reasons for the arrest of the individual, the time of
the arrest, and the taking of the arrested person to a place of
custody, the identity of the law enforcement officials concerned,
and precise information concerning the place of custody. These
records must be communicated to the detained person or his
counsel.
4. A system of inspection and monitoring of periods of interrogation must be established, which would include videotaping interrogations.
5. Access to legal counsel must be provided from the moment of
detention and detainees must be entitled to request the presence of counsel during interrogation.
C. Access To Legal Counsel
1. Introduction
ISA detainees are routinely denied access to legal counsel.
During their first sixty days of detention, this involves an absolute denial of any form of contact with legal counsel, serving
only to enhance the vulnerability of the detainees and increase
the likelihood of their exposure to forms of physical and psychological abuse. Individuals detained pursuant to a Ministerial order issued under Section 8, and transferred to detention camps,
are generally permitted some access to legal counsel, but even
this is severely restricted, and fails to meet internationally recognized standards.
This section examines Malaysia's commitments under international and domestic law to provide persons detained with effective legal counsel. Against these standards, it assesses the extent to which current practice falls far short of these undertakings and compromises the Malaysian government's ability to
protect the rights of detainees, first by examining the extent to
which denial of legal assistance facilitates the mistreatment and
manipulation of the detainees by police authorities during inter-
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rogation; secondly, by examining the inability of legal counsel,
given the polices' refusal to provide consultation time, to mount
successful legal challenges on behalf of their clients and so ensure that those wrongly detained are offered the earliest possible
release. Both these problems assume that legal counsel are willing to provide their services to ISA detainees but the final part of
this section examines the extent to which that willingness is
eroded by interference and intimidation directed at the individual lawyers specifically and the legal profession more generally.
2. Malaysia's Human Rights Obligations
a. International Obligations
The right of those arrested to legal assistance is so fundamental that it finds expression in all the regional human rights
instruments.1 56 It also finds expression in Article 14 of the
ICCPR, guaranteeing to everyone charged with a criminal of-

fence the right to "have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and to communicate with counsel of his
157
own choosing."'

The Human Rights Committee, established under the
ICCPR, has in considering the various individual petitions
brought before it, given substantive content to the right of legal
assistance - emphasizing time and again that the right to legal
assistance is to avail the detainee from the moment of her arrest. 158 In the context of special anti-terrorist laws enacted in
156. See African Charter, supra n.95, art. 7. Article 7 states: "Every individual shall
have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: .. .(g) the right to defence,
including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice." Id. See also American
Convention, supra n.117, art.8. Article 8 states:"... During the [criminal] proceedings,
every person is entitled, with full equality to the following minimum guarantees ... (h)
the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel
of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel." Id.;
ECHR, supra n.95, art. 6. Article 6 states: "Everyone charges with a criminal offence has
the following minimum rights: . .. (e) to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require." Id.
157. ICCPR, supra n.87, art. 14(3)(b).
158. See Senegal, A/48/40, vol. 1, para. 104 (1993): "The right of access to legal
counsel begins from the moment an individual is deprived of his freedom." Id. See also
Venezuela, A/48/40, vol. 1, at 61, para. 310 (1993): "[A]n accused person ... should
have access to his lawyers from the time of arrest." d.; Georgia, A/52/40, vol. 1, at 40.
para. 254 (1997): "All persons who are arrested must immediately have access to counsel .. ." Id.; Algeria, A/53/40, vol. f, at 52, para. 360 (1998): "The State party must
ensure [that] .. .all persons arrested .. .have immediate access to a lawyer." Id.
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France, the Committee has expressed particular concern that
the accused is denied the right to contact a lawyer during the
initial seventy-two hours of detention in police custody.' 5 9 While
the Committee is evidently troubled by the prejudice to the quality of defense that results from this lack of access,"' it also fears
the mistreatment of the detainee that may occur and has noted
with alarm the circumstances in which interrogation has proceeded without the presence of defense counsel. 6 '
The Committee against Torture, established under the
CAT, 162 has underscored the importance of access to counsel in
protecting against abuse.' 6 3 In respective petitions, it noted that
the "likelihood of commission of acts of torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment would be limited if suspects
had easy access to a lawyer"" 4 and that "[a] major obstacle in
efforts to prevent torture is the difficulty experienced by accused
persons in gaining access to a lawyer of their choice." '6 5
The right of legal assistance and the important protections
it provides is not removed by a formalistic insistence that the
right only avails those charged with a criminal offence - in other
words, only those who have not had the misfortune of being detained under preventive detention laws that do not provide for
criminal charges. The protection is far more substantive and robust, as evidenced by Principles 17 and 18 of the Body of Princi159. See France, A/52/40 vol. 1, para. 410 (1997).
160. SeeJapan A/49/40, vol. I, para. 110 (1994).
161. See id.: "It is of concern that the guarantees contained in articles 9, 10 and 14
are not fully complied with, in that ... most of the time interrogation does not take
place in the presence of the detainee's counsel." Id.
162. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, June 26, 1987, art.17 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
163. The prohibition on torture forms part of international customary law. While
Malaysia has not ratified CAT and is not theoretically subject to the Committee against
Torture'sjurisdiction, the Committee's pronouncements nonetheless represent authoritative statements on the evolving norms applicable to the prohibition on torture.
164. Poland, A/52/44, at 18, para. 110 (1997).
165. Ukraine, A/52/44, at 23, para. 138 (1997). See also United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, A/51/44, at 12, para. 61 (1996). Paragraph 61 provides:
[T] hat maintenance of emergency legislation in Northern Ireland and of separate detention or holding centers will inevitably continue to create conditions
leading to the breach of the Convention. This is particularly so because at
present the practice of permitting legal counsel to consult with their clients at
their interrogations is not yet permitted.
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pies.' 6 6

These Principles guarantee to all persons under any
form of detention, the right to have the assistance of legal counsel and to be provided with reasonable facilities for exercising it.
So central is this right that it may not be suspended or restricted
"save in exceptional circumstances to be specified by law or lawful regulations, when it is considered indispensable by a judicial
or other authority in order to maintain security and good or' 16 7
der."
Like the Body of Principles, the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers ("Basic Principles on Lawyers") 68
and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners169 both emphasize that the right to legal assistance obtains,
irrespective of the issuing of a criminal charge. 70 This consis166. Body of Principles, supra n.120, at Principles 17-18. Principle 17 reads:
1.A detained person shall be entitled to have the assistance of a legal counsel.
He shall be informed of his right by the competent authority promptly after
arrest and shall be provided with reasonable facilities for exercising it.
2. If a detained person does not have a legal counsel of his own choice, he
shall be entitled to have a legal counsel assigned to him by ajudicial or other
authority in all cases where the interests of justice so require and without payment by him if he does not have sufficient means to pay.
Id. Principle 18 reads:
1. A detained or imprisoned person shall be entitled to communicate and
consult with his legal counsel.
2. A detained or imprisoned person shall be allowed adequate time and facilities for consultation with his legal counsel.
3. The right of a detained or imprisoned person to be visited by and to consult
and communicate, without delay or censorship and in full confidentiality, with
his legal counsel may not be suspended or restricted save in exceptional circumstances, to be specified by law or lawful regulations, when it is considered
indispensable by ajudicial or other authority in order to maintain security and
good order.
4. Interviews between a detained or imprisoned person and his legal counsel
may be within sight, but not within hearing, of a law enforcement official.
5. Communications between a detained or imprisoned person and his legal
counsel mentioned in the present principle shall be inadmissible as evidence
against the detained or imprisoned person unless they are connected with a
continuing or contemplated crime.
Id.
167. Id. at Principle 18(3).
168. Approved by the General Assembly in 1990. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.
1 (1990).
169. See supra n. 124.
170. Article 7 of the Basic Principles on Lawyers, supra n.168, provides:
Governments shall further ensure that all persons arrested or detained, with
or without criminal charge, shall have prompt access to a lawyer, and in any
case not later than forty-eight hours from the time of arrest or detention.
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tency in expression of all these contemporary pronouncements
on the rights of those arrested and detained, and the general
support these documents command, indicate that this right has,
in fact, been elevated to an emerging norm of customary international law. The Basic Principles on Lawyers stipulates that the
right of access to legal counsel must be provided not "later than
1 7 and
forty-eight hours from the time of arrest or detention,""
like the Body of Principles and the Standard Minimum Rules
requires that consultations take place in full confidentiality, admissibly "within sight, but not within hearing, of law enforce'1 72
ment officials.'
The right of effective legal assistance presupposes an availability and willingness on the part of legal professionals to perform this role and the role of the state in facilitating an environment in which lawyers are willing and able to provide effective
legal assistance is recognized in international law. In particular,
the Basic Principles on Lawyers enumerates a number of guarantees for the functioning of lawyers, requiring that governments
ensure that lawyers "are able to perform all of their professional
functions without intimidation, hindrance, harassment or improper interference, ' 17' are able to "consult with their clients
freely," 174 and shall not "suffer, or be threatened with, prosecution or administrative, economic or other sanctions for any action taken in accordance with recognized professional duties,
standards and ethics.' 7 5 Where lawyers in discharging their duties are subject to threat, "they shall be adequately safeguarded
Id. Article 93, within Part 11, Section C, entitled "Prisoners Under Arrest or Awaiting
Trial" of the Standard Minimum Rules, supra n.124, provides: "For the purposes of
defence, an untried prisoner shall be allowed ... to receive visits from his legal advisor
with a view to his defence and to prepare and hand him confidential instructions..."
Id. Article 95 of Part II, Section E, entitled: "Persons Arrested or Detained Without
Charge" provides:
Without prejudice to the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, persons arrested or imprisoned without charge shall be
accorded the same protection as that accorded under part I and part II, section C.
Id.
171. Basic Principles, supra n.168, art. 7.
172. Basic Principles, supra n.168, art. 8; see also Body of Principles, supra n.121, at
Principle 18(5); Standard Minimum Rules, supra n.124, art. 93.
173. Basic Principles, supra n.168, art. 16(a).
174. Id. art. 16(b).
175. Id. art. 16(c).
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by authorities."' 7 6 They shall also be assured access to all appropriate information within sufficient time to enable them to provide "effective legal assistance to their clients," 7 7 and consultations shall be confidential. 7 8 The Basic Principles on Lawyers
goes beyond protection to individual lawyers in the discharge of
their professional duties, and expressly recognizes their right to
freedom of expression, belief, association, and assembly. No
prejudice shall result from their participation in public discussions on matters like the administration ofjustice or the promotion and protection of human rights, or their involvement in local, national, or international organizations. 7' They shall also
be entitled "to form and join self-governing professional associations to represent their interests, promote their continuing edu' 80
cation and training and protect their professional integrity."'
b. Domestic Obligations
One of the fundamental liberties inscribed in the Malaysian
Constitution is the right of persons arrested to be "allowed to
consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice."' s
As was set out in the earlier discussion on the right to be informed as soon as may be of the grounds for arrest, also granted
under Article 5(3), the protections established under Article 5
are not withdrawn from the ISA detainee unless the ISA's provisions are expressly inconsistent with these protections. The ISA,
however, contains no provision that denies those arrested and
detained access to legal counsel and is accordingly not inconsistent with Article 5(3).182 On the contrary, the ISA remains subject to the Article 5(3) right of access to legal counsel.
Unfortunately, legal precedent on this issue has been far
from clear. The Malaysian High Court in the case of Ramli bin
Salleh v. Inspector Yahya Bin HashimR8 and the Federal Court in
176. Id. art. 17.
177. Id. art. 21.
178. Id. art. 22
179. Id. art. 23.
180. Id. art. 24.
181. MALAY. CONST., art. 5(3).
182. This argument was submitted by the appellants in Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd
Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals, Outline of Arguments for the Appellants,
supra n.129, at 60-66.
183. [19731 1 M.L.J. 54.

UNJUST ORDER

2003]

1395

the case of Assa Singh v. Menteri Besar,Johore184 demonstrated a
willingness to read the provisions of Article 5(2) and (3) into
Statutes that were silent on the issue "with the result that the
applicant must be informed as soon as may be of the ground of
his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended by a
legal practitioner of his choice . . .
However, the Federal
Court in the cases of Ooi Ah Phua v. Officer in Charge of Criminal
8
Investigation, Kedah/Perlis"'
and Hashim bin Saud v. Yahaya bin
8
7
Hashim, indicated a reluctance to give unqualified expression
to the right of access to legal counsel, observing that the right
could be subject to such legitimate restrictions as may be necessary in the interests of justice in order to prevent any undue interference with the course of investigation. This reticence
culminated in the judgment in Theresa Lim Chin Chin v. Inspector
General of Police, where the presiding judge in the Federal Court
held that "the matter should best be left to the good judgment
of the authority as and when such right might not interfere with
police investigation. To show breach of Article 5(3), an applicant has to show that the police has deliberately and with bad
faith obstructed a detainee from exercising his right under the
Article." 8 8
However, as evidenced by the recent judgment in Mohamad
Ezam Bin Nor & Others v. The Chief of Police, the Federal Court has
essentially reversed itself and police will no longer be able to
count on judicial tolerance for their denial of access to legal
counsel. Writing for the entire bench, Judge Siti Norma Yaakob
found that denial of legal assistance during the initial sixty-day
detention period "is conduct unreasonable and a clear violation
of Article 5(3) . . . Responding to the Respondent's argument
that under the ISA, the police has absolute powers during the
entire period of the sixty day detention to refuse access under
the guise that the investigations were ongoing ... I find nojustification to support the Respondent's argument."'8 "
184. [1969] 2 M.L.J.
185. [1973] 1 M.L.J.
186. [1975] 2 M.L.J.
187. [1977] 2 M.L.J.
188. [1998] 1 M.L.J.
189. Mohamad Ezam
4 M.L.J. 449.

30.
54.
198.
116.
293.
bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals, 2002-
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3. Problems
a. Inability to Mount Legal Challenge
In practice, the authorities prohibit any of form of communication between detainees and legal counsel during the first
sixty days of detention. During the mission, members of the delegation observed the habeas corpus proceedings brought on behalf of Sejahratul Dursina 91 ' before the Shah Alam High Court
on June 4, 2002, and were sharply reminded of the injustice of
this prohibition. Her lawyers explained to the Presiding Justice
that Chomel had by then been "kept incommunicado for 47
days" and they urged that they be granted access so that they
might "know what is happening to her."' 9 1 Chomel's lawyers further argued that without access to her they were unable to con1 92
sult with their client.
Certainly, the practice of refusing access to legal counsel
during the first sixty days of detention is hardly new, and in fact
appears to have been standard procedure since the inception of
the ISA. Interviews with detainees from the 1960s and 1970s
confirm that they, too, were denied any form of legal assistance
during their first sixty days of detention,1 9 3 and those detained
in 1987, as part of Operation Lalang, report similar experiences. 91 4 However, the practice today works more seriously to
prejudice the circumstances of the detainee than it did those detained in previous decades. The 1988 amendment to the ISA effectively bars the judiciary from exercising any form of judicial
review of the Minister's orders of detention under Section 8. Accordingly, the only chance of successful review is that exercised
in respect of the first sixty days of detention, authorized under
Section 73. Yet if lawyers are prohibited from consulting with
their clients, as they always are, it is enormously difficult to make
application for such review within those first sixty days and ac190. A.k.a. Chomel Mohamad. See KMM-linked Woman ISA DetaineeReleased, MALAvJune 13, 2002; Wife of Terror Suspect says Arrest was Pressure Tactic, MALAYSIAKINI,
June 15, 2002.
191. Delegation's Notes from Trial (June 4, 2002).
192. Id.
193. See Interviews with Ban Ahkam (detained 1968, released 1978); Lim Yoon
Pang (detained 1963, released 1967); Koh Swee Yong (detained in 1976, released in
1977); and Chong Ton Sin(detained in 1968 for 28 days) Uune 3, 2002).
194. See Interview with Dr. Nasir Hashim (detained in 1987 for 15 months) (June
3, 2003).
SIAKINI,
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cordingly be offered the chance of effective remedy - in these
circumstances, immediate release. Opportunity to make application for review and attain effective remedy is effectively foreclosed once detainees are transferred under two-year detention
1 95
orders to the detention camps.
Once detainees are transferred to detention camps under
Ministerial orders of detention, they are allowed to consult with
their lawyers, and it is at this stage that the lawyers "learn a lot
about what happened under the sixty days detention - for instance that their questioning was irrelevant, that they were asked
about their sexual preferences, etc., but not about any connection to terrorist attacks."' 96 But even here access is unjustifiably
restricted. A number of the KeADILan detainees recount that
when they met with their lawyers, camp officers were stationed
such that they could hear "the entire conversation between myself and my lawyers. My request for a private and confidential
meeting with my lawyers to discuss my case was rejected."' 7 This
physical proximity of police officers during lawyer-client consultations in the detention camps militates against full disclosure
and accordingly, prejudices the detainee in the preparation of
his legal defense. Accordingly, a number of the affidavits of the
KeADILan detainees expressly state that they are submitted
"without prejudice to my rights to raise other matters if required
and when given the opportunity to do so."' 98
b. Facilitation of Police Abuse
Legal counsel is essential to mounting challenges to wrongful detention, but access to legal counsel is additionally important in serving as a constraint on police impunity for physical
and psychological abuse of detainees. A later section of this Report documents the full extent of abuse to which detainees are
subject. It is important here, however, to note that the severity
of the abuse and extremity of the conditions experienced by the
detainees noticeably diminish once they are transferred to the
195. Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals, Judgment of Abdul Malek Ahmad, FCJ, supra n.55.
196. See Interview with Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, lawyer (June 11, 2002).
197. See Aff. of Lokman Noor, supra n.140, at para. 39. See also Aff. of Mohamad
Ezam bin Mohd Nor, supra n.140, at para. 48; Aff. of Hishamuddin Bin Md Rais, supra
n.140, at para. 34; Aff. of Badrulamin Bin Bahran, supra n.140, at para. 70.
198. See Affs. supra n.140.
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detention camps, where they are also permitted access to legal
counsel.1 9 9 The lawyer's ability to report the circumstances of
the detainee's abuse, not only to the courts, but also to the public at large, serves as an important safeguard for the detainee
and a substantial disincentive to the would-be abuser. Lawyers
have, thus far, been unable to perform this important role during the period of initial custody.
The absence of counsel during the first sixty-day period,
during which intensive and prolonged interrogation takes place,
has meant that detainees are not only more vulnerable to physical and psychological abuse, but also to the likelihood that their
personal statements and testimony will be manipulated. After
hours of questioning and threats made by their interrogators,
unable to consult legal counsel, many detainees sign what
amount to fabricated admissions of guilt, believing these to be
their best chances of early release. Lokman Noor's experience
in submitting a personal statement is indicative:
Some of the information was given by the Interrogating Officer, like abuses of the leaders and so on, which was used as
my own personal statements. Some were written by myself
particularly the facts that were within my knowledge. Then, I
only wanted to be released. My state of mind at that time was
tense, anxious, disturbed and confused. They repeated their
questions, shouting and pressing me until I gave the answers
they wanted. 2°°
Evidence that interrogating officers tamper with the personal statements of the detainees also appears from statements
made by Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Nor: "He [the investigating
officer] informed me that his superiors ordered that he obtain a
testimony from me; if not, I would be seen as not co-operating
and would be detained for a further two years. I told him that I
did not want to make any testimony and I would not sign or be
responsible for any statement. The investigating officer told me
that he still had to put my testimony in the statement.1"201
Clearly, abuse of detainees and manipulation of their testimonies would cease, or at least be drastically reduced, were the Ma199. See Interview with Malik lntiaz Sarwar, lawyer (June 11, 2002).
200. See Aff. of Lokman Noor, supla n.140, at para. 35. See also Aff. of Raja Petra,
supra n.140, at para. 18.
201. Aft. of Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Nor, supra n.140, at para. 46.
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laysian government to act in compliance of both its international
and domestic obligations and grant those detained under Section 73 of the ISA the opportunity to consult with legal practitioners of their choice.
c. Harassment of Legal Counsel
The Malaysian system acts to constrain effective legal assistance by limiting contact between individuals detained under
the ISA and legal counsel willing to act on their behalf. It also
does so, less visibly and therefore perhaps more perniciously, by
subjecting lawyers prepared to act in this capacity to undue interference and harassment. 2 2 Cheah Kah Peng, lawyer for KeADILan detainee Tian Chua, reported following Chua to the police
station after his arrest: " I asked to consult with Tian Chua and
was refused. [The police] began pushing Tian Chua around
and they arrested me as well. ' 2 ° 3 Both Sankaran Nair and
Pawancheek Marican, lawyers for former Deputy Prime Minister
Anwar Ibrahim, have been targets of harassment. Each has had
his office broken into and materials removed. 2 4 For lawyer,
Sivarasa Rasiah, the experience of interference has been less
overt: "I don't get any threatening phone calls or anything like
that - but we're watched. There is surveillance, the Special
Branch is there. . . My home phones are tapped from time to
time. ' 2 5 Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, another prominent defender of
ISA detainees corroborated the experience of constant surveillance, and explained that lawyers who undertake this type of
practice are subject to the surveillance of the Special Branch, but
also "frequent visits from officials of the Tax Department.
While this type of interference is not always physically intimidating, particularly as defense lawyers have become accustomed
to almost continuous surveillance, it does, nonetheless, have a
chilling effect on the numbers of lawyers willing to take such
cases and thereby be subject to heightened scrutiny. All this
stands in stark contrast to the Basic Principles on Lawyers' requirement that Malaysia guarantee that lawyers "are able to per202. For a detailed study on the chilling effect of intimidation of defense lawyers
in the context of emergency laws, see Martin Flaherty, Human Rights Violations Against
Defense lawyers: the Case of Northern Ireland, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87 (1994).
203. Interviews with Cheah Kah Peng and Gooi Hock Seng, lawyers (june 8, 2002).
204. Id. see also Interview with Pawancheek Marican (June 11, 2002).
205. Interview with Sivarasa Rasiah, lawyer (une 11, 2002).
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form all of their professional functions without intimidation,
hindrance, harassment or improper interference. '"206
The Malaysian Bar Council, too, has been subject to government pressures that appear designed to result in a more government-compliant professional association. Article 46(A) of the
Legal Profession Act 2°1 7 provides for disqualification from the
Malaysian Bar Council of any member who is "a member of either House of Parliament, or of a State Legislative Assembly, or
of any local authority," 2°8 or if she holds "office in any trade
union or political party" 2119 or "any other organization, body or
group of persons whatsoever, whether or not it is established
under any law, whether it is in Malaysia or outside Malaysia,
which has objectives or carries on activities which can be construed as being political in nature, character or effect, or which
is declared by the Attorney-General by order published in the
GAZETTE, to be an organization, body or group of persons which
1
' 2 1°
has such objectives or carries on such activities.
While this law appears facially neutral in application, it nevertheless expressly conflicts with the Basic Principles of Lawyers
that guarantee lawyers' freedom of expression, belief, association, and assembly. 211 Also, contrary to its appearance of facial
neutrality, the law is likely to disproportionately prejudice those
who engage in opposition politics, or groups that oppose government policies and are so deemed "political" by the Attorney-General. Currently, Sivarasa Rasiah, a lawyer and political officer for
the Parti Rakyat Malaysia, is challenging the constitutionality of
Article 46 of the Legal Profession Act. 212 Given the political climate in Malaysia, it is lawyers like Sivarasa, who engage in opposition politics or are outspoken in their opposition to government policies, who are also those most likely to provide defense
to those detained under the ISA.
In the past year, the Minister responsible for legal development, Dr. Rais Yatim, has introduced a draft Bill for a Malaysian
206. Basic Principles on Lawyers, supra n.168.
207. Legal Profession Act 1976 (Act 166).
208. Id. art. 46(A)(b).
209. Id. art. 46(A) (c) (i)-(ii).
210. Id. art. 46(A) (c) (iii).
211. Basic Principles on Lawyers, supra n.169, art. 23.
212. See Interview with members of the Malaysian Bar Council's Human Rights
Committee (June 10, 2002).
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Academy of Law, proposing compulsory membership in the
Academy for all members of the legal profession - lawyers, academics, members of the Attorney-General's Office, and
judges. 2 1s The Bar Council has expressed strong reservations,
observing that the Bill is likely to violate Article 10 of the Malaysian Constitution, guaranteeing the right of association. 2 ,4 Practitioners further perceive the Bill as a measure intended to facilitate undue regulation of the profession. Members of the
Human Rights Committee of the Malaysian Bar Council explained during interviews with the delegation that "the Bill purports to be aimed at improved communication and accountability standards, but under the new law there would be no Bar elections and it allows the Minister to directly regulate the activities
of the Bar and would also allow for removal of any lawyer at the
discretion of the Minister." 2 15 The Bill has recently been withdrawn from Parliament and is unlikely to be enacted any time
soon. 2 16 Nonetheless, this government-initiated attempt to increase regulation of the legal profession serves to underscore the
extent to which Malaysian lawyers find their right to freedom of
association under substantial threat, and the even greater levels
of interference lawyers handling politically sensitive cases, like
ISA detentions, are likely to encounter.
In spite of this interference, the Malaysian Bar Council, or
at the very least a significant number of its members, continues
to evidence a spirit of independence that is praiseworthy. 2 17 The
Bar Council has an active and energetic Human Rights Committee, and as members of this Committee made plain during their
discussion with the delegation, a number of lawyers, who voluntarily respond to public interest demand. When large numbers
of arrests and detentions were made during the period of
Reformasi, over twenty-five lawyers responded to a request from
the Bar Council to render assistance in the preparation of de-

213. Id.
214. Statement of the Minister in the Prime Minister's Office, Datuk Seri Dr. Rais
Yatam, available at http://www.bheuu.gov.my/jph/main.shtml.
215. See Interview with members of the Malaysian Bar Council's Human Rights
Committee (June 10, 2002).
216. See Statement of the Minister in the Prime Minister's Office, supra n.214.
217. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Malaysian Bar Council on the Repeal of Laws
Relating to Detention Without Trial, supTa n.12.
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fense.2 18
4. Recommendations
The Malaysian system routinely denies ISA detainees access
to counsel. So deprived, ISA detainees are unable to challenge
the lawfulness of their arrests and detentions - difficult even in
the best of circumstance - and face greater likelihood of abuse
at the hands of police officials. When detainees are finally
granted access to counsel, generally after the first sixty-day period when any possibility of real remedy has expired, access is
often unnecessarily circumscribed. Defense counsel, themselves,
face intimidation and harassment, suffer prejudice if they
choose to hold office in any political party or other types of civic
association and recently, like all other members of the legal profession, have faced the prospect of compulsory membership in a
government-initiated and regulated association, so enhancing
the likelihood that their activities would be closely monitored.
The delegation recommends:
1. Access to counsel should be provided from the very moment
of detention, as provided in the U.N. Basic Principles on Lawyers. Detainees should be entitled to the presence of counsel
during detention. Detainees should also be offered other reasonable opportunity to consult with legal counsel during both
the sixty-day detention period, and in the detention camps. Opportunity for legal consultation free of interception, censorship,
and in full confidentiality, must be guaranteed.
2. The Malaysian government should thoroughly and expeditiously investigate and halt all instances of persecution and surveillance of ISA defense lawyers pursuing their legitimate work.
3. Lawyers must be guaranteed the right to participate in lawful
political activities without suffering prejudice. In particular, the
provisions of the Legal Profession Act disqualifying individuals
who hold office in any trade union, or political party, or any
other organization deemed political in nature by the AttorneyGeneral, should be repealed.
4. The Malaysian Bar Association should be guaranteed the independent exercise of its functions free of external interference.
218. See Interview with members of the Malaysian Bar Council's Human Rights
Committee, supra n.215.
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The Malaysian Academy of Law Bill mandating compulsory
membership for all legal professionals should be abandoned.
5. Efforts should be made to educate law enforcement personnel of the international and constitutional provisions that allow
ISA detainees access to counsel. Educational efforts should also
be undertaken in respect of the essential service provided by defense counsel and their right to conduct their professional activities free of intimidation.
D. Absence of Effective Forms of Review
1. Introduction
Perhaps the most authoritarian of the ISA's provisions is the
1988 amendment, which precludes judicial review of any decision made by the Minister or Yang di-Pertuan Agong in the exercise of his discretionary powers afforded under the Act. In effect, the ISA detainee is denied any effective remedy for unlawful or invalid arrest and detention, because while review of the
exercise of discretionary powers afforded police under the ISA
remains theoretically possible, denial of access to legal counsel
makes legal challenge during the first sixty-day period of detention almost impossible, and thereafter, ineffective. 2 19 Limited
opportunities for redress are rarely seized by an often unjustifiably compliant judiciary, albeit one that has suffered severe attacks on its independence - the subject of a comprehensive International Bar Association ("IBA") investigation and report.2 20
In those rare instances in which judges have undertaken review
of executive action under the ISA, their actions have often met
with punitive or retaliatory measures. The Federal Constitution
and the ISA mandates an alternative form of review in the establishment of an Advisory Board, but as documented later in the
219. The recent judgment of Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis
Negara & Other Appeal, 2002-4 M.L.J. 449, illustrates the ongoing nature of this problem. Although the Federal Court held that the initial arrests and detentions effected
under the discretionary powers afforded police by the ISA were unlawful and ultra vires,
the detainees were granted no remedy. The Court reasoned that "as the appellants
have now been detained by order of the Minister under S.8 of the Act, the issue of
whether or not to grant the writ of habeas corpus for their release from current detention does not concern us. That is a matter of a different exercise." See Judgment of
Steve L.K. Shim, CJSS.
220. JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: MALAYSIA 2000, REPORT OF A MISSION ON BEHALF OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION & OTHERS, availableat http://www.ibanet.org [hereinafterJusTlCE IN JEOPARDY].
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Report, this type of review exists in form only, offering no prospect of effective remedy.
It is these features - together securing the absence of any
effective form of review, of remedy or redress for the detainee that provide the focus of the next section of the Report. The
section begins by enumerating the applicable international and
domestic standards. These provide the framework within which
the ISA's provisions - its express ouster of judicial review and
authorization of non-disclosure of any information deemed sensitive; attacks on the independence of the judiciary and its consequent conservatism and finally the (non) workings of the Advisory Board - might be assessed.
2. Malaysia's Human Rights Obligation
a. International Obligations
The UDHR enshrines the right of everyone "in full equality
to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and
of any criminal charge against him. 22 ' Importantly, the right is
not limited to circumstances in which an individual has been formally charged with a criminal offence. The ICCPR elaborates on
this right, requiring that the tribunal not only be independent
and impartial, but that it also be "competent" and "established
by law."' 2 2 2 It requires, in addition, that those persons deprived
of their liberty by arrest or detention "be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order release if
'223
the detention is not lawful.
Even in circumstances making derogation from these rights
permissible - among other things, the existence of a "public
emergency which threatens the life of the [N]ation" - certain
threshold standards continue to apply. In particular, the Body
of Principles 224 sets forth certain core guidelines for the protection of all prisoners and detainees, applicable even during times
221. UDHR, supra n.79, art. 10.
222. ICCPR, supra n.87, art. 14(1). Article 14(1) states: "In the determination of
any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law." Id.
223. Id. art. 9(4).
224. Body of Principles, supra n.120.
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of public emergency. Although the Body of Principles does not
constitute a treaty, it has received the approval of the General
Assembly and reflects considered global consensus that evidences emergent customary international law.
Among other things, the Body of Principles provides that
"the authorities which arrest a person, keep him under detention or investigate the case shall exercise only the powers
granted to them under the law and the exercise of these powers
225
shall be subject to recourse to a judicial or other authority.
The Principles further state that a "person shall not be kept in
detention without being given an effective opportunity to be
heard promptly by a judicial or other authority, "226 and that "a
judicial or other authority shall be empowered to review as appropriate the continuance of detention." 227 Moreover, detained
persons or their counsel "shall be entitled at any time to take
proceedings according to domestic law before ajudicial or other
authority to challenge the lawfulness of his detention in order to
obtain his release without delay, if it is unlawful. ' 2 2 1 In requiring
that recourse be had to a "judicial or other authority," the Body
of Principles refers to a 'judicial or other authority under the law
whose status and tenure should afford the strongest possible
guarantees of competence, impartiality and independence. "229
The U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary ("U.N. Judiciary Principles") ,2 ° another document reflecting the emergence of customary international norms, also provides for the effectiveness of judicial review by setting forth certain core principles to safeguard the integrity and autonomy of
courts throughout the world. Among other things, the U.N. Judiciary Principles assert that "[t]he independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the States and enshrined in the Constitution or the laws of the country. It is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the
independence of thejudiciary. ''231 They further provide that the
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
Cong., at
231.

Id. at Principle 9.
Id. at Principle 11 (1).
Id. at Principle 11 (3).
Id. at Principle 32(1).
Id. at Use of Terms.
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, G.A. Res. 40/32, 7th
59, U.N. Doc A/CONF, 121/22/Rev.1 (1985).
Id. at Principle 1.
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judiciary shall decide matters "without any restrictions, improper
influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect from any quarter or for any reason. ' 2 2 In addition, the Principles declare that the method for selecting judges
should be free of "improper motives," 23 " and thatjudges should
be suspended or removed only for actions that make them unable to discharge their duties." 4
b. Domestic Obligations
Among the fundamental liberties enshrined by the Malaysian Federal Constitution, is the right to judicial review in cases
of alleged unlawful detention. Specifically, Article 5(2) provides
that "[w]here complaint is made to a High Court or any judge
thereof that a person is being unlawfully detained the Court
shall inquire into the complaint and, unless satisfied that the detention is lawful, shall order him to be produced before the
Court and release him. ' 235 As has been explained in a previous
section of this Report, Article 5 is among those fundamental
rights from which derogation is permitted, but only in circumstances where laws designed to inhibit action prejudicial to public order are expressly inconsistent with such rights.23 6 In respect of the ISA, the 1988 amendment prohibiting judicial review of "any act done or decision made by the Yang di-Pertuan
Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their discretionary
power in accordance with this Act" 237 stands in direct opposition
to the right afforded in Article 5 of the Federal Constitution.
However, no provisions of the ISA expressly deny or limit judicial review of discretionary powers exercised by police officers in
accordance with the Act.
3. Problems
a. ISA Textual Constraints
ISA prescriptions restricted the exercise of review powers
232. Id. at Principle 2.
233. Id. at Principle 10.
234. Id. at Principle 18.
235. MALAY. CONsT., art. 5(2).
236. Id. art. 149(1).
237. ISA, supra n.5, art. 8B(1). Judicial review of these executive decisions is excluded, save for questions on compliance relating to certain narrow procedural requirements.
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even prior to the 1988 amendment ousting judicial review. In
particular, Article 16 provides that "[n] othing in this Chapter or
in any rules made thereunder shall require the Minister or any
member of an Advisory Board or any public servant to disclose
facts or to produce documents which he considers it to be
against the national interest to disclose or produce. ' 23" This expansively-framed provision entitles any public servant at his or
her unlimited discretion to withhold large quantities of information from the court. Indeed, this grant of non-disclosure extends to the most significant information - the very facts that
purportedly support the necessity of the individual's arrest and
detention. Without such information, the court is manifestly unable to engage in judicial review. In dismissing the relevance of
an objective determination of whether the suspicion necessary to
effect ISA arrests and detentions had been formed, the Federal
Court in Theresa Lim Chin Chin made such a reading plain:
In this case, whether the objective or subjective test is applicable, it is clear that the [C]ourt will not be in a position to
review the fairness of the decision-making process by the police and the Minister because of the lack of evidence since the
Constitution and the law protect them from disclosing any
information and material
in their possession upon which they
23 9
decision
their
based
The authorization of non-disclosure strays far from contemporary practice in a number of jurisdictions, attempting more seriously to balance threats to national security against protection of
individuals' fundamental freedoms. South Africa, for example,
insists that security-sensitive information be made available to
the courts for examination, even while other individuals and
bodies may justly be refused such information.2" 0 In this man238. ISA, supra n.5, art. 16. Article 151 of the Constitution, entitled "Restrictions
on preventive detention" contains an analogous provision: "This Article does not require any authority to disclose facts whose disclosure would in its opinion be against the
national interest." MALAY. CONST., art. 151.

239. Theresa Lim Chin Chin v. Inspector-General of Police, [1998] 1 M.L.J. 293.
240. Under Section 41 of the South African Promotion of Access to Information
Act No. 2 of 2000, a public body may refuse a request for information if its disclosure:
(a) could reasonably be expected to cause prejudice to (i) the defence of the Republic;
(ii) the security of the Republic; ...
Id. However, Section 80, entitled "Disclosure of records to, and non-disclosure by,
court," provides:
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ner, not only do the individual's rights and liberties go uncompromised and national security interests are accommodated, but
the Court's powers of review are preserved and its role as the
most important and independent check on government is
powerfully reaffirmed.
The 1988 amendment 24 1 to the ISA substantially narrowed
the space within which those seeking to challenge the legality of
ISA arrests and detention could operate. While certain procedural requirements may nonetheless be invoked as the basis for judicial review, these are so limited as to be almost negligible.2 4 2 A
(1) Despite this Act and any other law, any court having an application, or an
appeal against a decision on that application, may examine any record of a
public or private body to whom this Act applies, and no such record may be
withheld from the court on any grounds.
(2) Any court contemplated in subsection (1) may not disclose to any person,
including the parties to the proceedings concerned, other than the public or
private body referred to in subsection (1) (a) any record of a public or private body which, on request to access,
may or must be refused; ...
Id.
241. See ISA, supra n.5, art. 8B. Article 8B provides:
(1) There shall be no judicial review in any court of, and no court shall exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any act done or decision made by the Yang
di-Pertaun Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their discretionary power
in accordance with this Act, save in regard to any question on compliance with
any procedural requirement in this Act governing such act or decision.
(2) The exception in regard to any question on compliance with any procedural requirement in subsection (1) shall not apply where the grounds are as
described in section 8A.
Id.
242. Section 8A of the ISA makes the following procedural defects ineligible for
review:
No detention order shall be invalid or inoperative by reason (a) that the person to whom it relates (i) was immediately after the making of the detention order detained in
any place other than a place of detention referred to in [S]ection 8(3);
(ii) continued to be detained immediately after the making of the detention order in a place in which he was detained under section 73 before his
removal to a place of detention referred to in [S] ection 8(3), notwithstanding
that the maximum period of such detention under [S]ection 73(3) had expired; or
(iii) was during the duration of the detention order on journey in police
custody or any other custody to a place of detention referred to in [S]ection
8(3); or
(b) that the detention order was served on him at any place other than the
place of detention referred to in [S]ection 8(3), or that there was any defect
relating to its service upon him.
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much more significant basis for judicial review is the exercise of
discretionary powers afforded police under the ISA, as there is
no express ouster in this regard. And yet, the Federal Court has
read the ouster in respect of Section 8 detentions - those authorized by the Minister and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong - to
apply equally with respect to Section 73 detentions, those effected by police officers, essentially upholding an absolute prohibition on the powers ofjudicial review. In Theresa Lim Chin Chin,
the Federal Court reasoned:
[W]e cannot see how the police power of arrest and detention under [S]ection 73 could be separated from the ministerial power to issue the order of detention under [S]ection 8.
We are of the opinion that there is only one preventive detention and that is based on the order to be made by the Minister under [S]ection 8.243
Although this reasoning is not expressly mandated by the textual
provisions of the ISA, it nonetheless keeps faith with the intent
motivating the amendment. Together, the textual prescriptions
of the ISA act to severely impair the right of individuals deprived
of their liberty by arrest and detention "to take proceedings
before a court, in order that the court may decide without delay
on the unlawfulness"2 4' 4 of the detention. The limited opportunities for review that remain are now threatened by proposed
amendments that have arisen in response to the Federal Court's
ruling in Mohamad Ezam Bin Mohd Nor & Others v. Ketua Polis
Negara,215 holding that the five challenged arrests and detentions were unlawful and ultra vires. The threatened amendments
include the proposal that police no longer be required to defend detentions in court, that no negative inferences may be
drawn from their decision not to do so, and a second proposal
that detainees be prohibited from divulging any details of their
interrogations before the court.246 Should these proposed
amendments be enacted, review of police powers will be rendered meaningless, leaving detainees without the possibility of
any form of review.
In the following section, the generally deferential nature of
243. Theresa Lim Chin Chin v. Inspector-General of Police, [1998] 1 M.L.J. 293.
244. ICCPR, supra n.87, art. 9(4).
245. See Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara & Other Appeals,
2002-4 M.LJ. 449.
246. See Interview with Gobalakrishnan a/I Nagappan, supra n.154.
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the judiciary and government-initiated measures designed to ensure the judiciary's compliance are discussed in light of their
propensity to further narrow judicial review.
b. Judicial Independence
With rare exceptions,

24 7

where adjudication of ISA matters

is concerned, judges act with extreme deference to the executive. This approach stands in stark contrast to the canonical interpretive principle that legislative intrusions in respect of individuals' liberty be construed in favorem libertas - that inroads
made upon established principles ofjustice be strictly construed.
As one of the lawyers who met with the delegation observed:
the lack of judicial independence in this country is due to a
lack of understanding of the proper role of the judiciary.
Judges in this country see themselves as nothing more than
see theirjob as upholdan arm of the executive branch. They
248
ing the judgment of the executive.

In those rare instance in which courts have acted to protect individual liberties, as in Abdul Ghani Haroon v. Ketua Polis Negara &

Another Application,2 4 9 where the High Court ruled that the detainee was entitled to be present in court at the hearing of the
habeas corpus application, such rulings have been quickly reversed on appeal.25 °
247. See, for instance, the judgment of Judge Hishamuddin Mohd in Abdul Ghani
Haroon v. Ketua Polis Negara & Another Application, 2001-2 M.L.J. 689, ordering the
release of two of the KeADILan-10, and his courageous obiter dictum:
With the greatest of humility, perhaps it is high time for Parliament to consider whether the ISA, which was originally to counter Communist terrorism
in the early years of independence, is really relevant to the present-day situation of this nation of ours. Or, if at all to be retained, at least whether its
provisions need to be thoroughly reviewed to prevent or minimize the abuses
which I have highlighted in this judgment.
Id.
248. Interview with lawyer, Malik lmtiaz Sarwar, supra n.196.
249. 2001-6 M.L.J. 203. See also MALIK IMTIAZ SARWAR & CHRISTOPHER LEONG, THE
TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF HUMPTY-DUMPTY:

FUNDAMENTAL

LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL

(2002).
250. Abdul Ghani Haroon v. Ketua Polis Negara & Another Application [2001] 4
MLJ 11 where the Federal Court held that the detainee was not entitled to be present at
the hearing of his application, reasoning in unduly formalistic terms that "no oral evidence is required in the habeas corpus proceeding and the issue of the detainee being
Id. See also SARWAR &
prejudiced would not arise. He had the benefit of counsel .
LEONG, supra n.250, at 13. This article observes that:
[T]here is no point to being represented by counsel where said counsel have
SECURITY, ARE THE COURTS STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE? 11
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Even the recent landmark judgment of Mohamad Ezam Bin
Mohd Nor & Others v. Ketua Polis Negara includes a disconcerting
deferential element: although the Federal Court held that the
detentions of the appellants were unlawful and believed that
they should be released accordingly, the Court stopped short of
ordering release, reasoning that their subsequent detention pursuant to a Ministerial order rendered their release from current
'
detention a matter that "does not concern us." 251
Yet, this reluctance to alter the status of individuals detained by Ministerial
order is in no way mandated by the judicial ouster contained in
Section 8B of the ISA; instead, it reflects an unnecessary judicial
timidity.
The executive-mindedness of the judiciary arises from a
number of factors. Firstly, the Malaysian judiciary is unnecessarily shielded from public criticism, even assuming that some degree of insulation is necessary to ensure an independent and
respected judiciary. Thejudiciary's increased resort to contempt
of court proceedings against lawyers deemed to have acted inappropriately can only have a chilling effect on counsels' willingness to critique the judiciary and judgments rendered, as well as
impair their ability to provide effective legal counsel.2 5 2 Other
attempts to stifle criticism of the judiciary include the September
2000 court ruling prohibiting the Malaysian Bar Council from
discussing the conduct of judges, in particular the alleged misconduct of then Chief Justice Eusoff Chin, at a planned Ex2 53
traordinary General Meeting.
Conversely, the courts are particularly vulnerable to pressures from the government. As several lawyers who met with the
no clue as to what happened or is happening to their clients as they cannot get
instructions. As surprising as it may seem, this is usually the consequence of
not getting access, and will amount to deprivation of the right to be heard.
Id.
251. See Mohamad Ezam Bin Mohd Nor & Others v. Ketua Polis Negara, Judgment
of Steve L.K. Shim, CJSS, 2002-4 M.L.J. 449.
252. See Att'y Gen., Malaysia v. Manjeet Singh Dhillon, 1991-1 M.L.J. 167; MBf Capital Bhd & Anor. v. Tommy Thomas & Another, 1999-1 M.LJ. 139; Zainur bin Zakaria v.
Public Prosecutor, 2000-4 M.L.J. 134, where the court held, obiter: "We observe that
lately there has been an increase in contempt offences being committed by advocates
and solicitors. As such we feel the time is now ripe for imposition of custodial sentences
in contempt offences." Id.

SIA 2000, supra n.222.
253. REPORT BY THE
ERS, supra n.154, at 23.

All three cases are discussed inJUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: MALAY-

OBSERVATORY FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFEND-
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delegation remarked, the judiciary has, in fact, never fully recovered from the assault it sustained in 1988.54 At the time, the
Constitution was amended to make the jurisdiction and powers
of the Court subject to federal law rather than the Constitution,
making it possible for Parliament to limit or abolish judicial review by a simple majority vote rather than the two-thirds required for constitutional amendment. 255 That same year also
witnessed the suspension, on the eve of a crucial court decision
on the legal status of UMNO, of the Lord President of the Federal Court, Tun Salleh Abbas, and his subsequent dismissal on
grounds of "misbehaviour in the form of bias against the government. 12 56 Five of the remaining Supreme Courtjudges were also
suspended, and two later dismissed. 2 57 Tun Salleh Abbas, meeting with the delegation, stated that the crisis had been precipitated by a breakdown in the relationship between the judiciary
and the executive: "the government thought any decision we
[the judiciary] made against them was interference with the executive power." 25" He explained that one of the factors leading
to his dismissal was a letter he had written to the Prime Minister
expressing the judiciary's unhappiness at the Prime Minister's
259
public criticism of individual judges.
Recent assaults on the independence of the judiciary have
included the transferal of individual judges who issued rulings
unfavorable to the executive. Shah Alam High Court Judge,
Hishamudin Mohd, who ordered the release of KeADILan detainees, N. Gobalakrishnan and Abdul Ghani Haroon, found
himself transferred to the commercial law division of the Kuala
Lumpur High Court,2 60 thus limiting his ability to issue any further decisions favorable to ISA detainees. It also remains fairly
commonplace for members of the executive to sharply criticize
254. See Interview with Ngeow Yin Ngee, lawyer (June 2, 2002); Interview with
Sivara Rasiah, lawyer (June 11, 2002); Interview with Karpal Singh, lawyer Uune, 11
2002); Interview with former Lord President of the Federal Court, Tun Salleh Abbas
(June 13, 2002).
255. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra n.31, at 10.

256.
257.
258.
(June 13,
259.
260.
(June 13,

Id. at 11.
Id.
Interview with Tun Salleh Abbas, former Lord President of the Federal Court
2002).
Id.
Former Chief Justice, Tun Sallch Abbas, confirmed this fact in his Interview
2002).
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the judiciary for any adverse decisions - Prime Minister
Mahathir recently stated that 'judges who do not agree with laws
passed by Parliament should excuse themselves when hearing
such cases."
Consequently, the judiciary must operate in a destabilizing
context, vulnerable to various pressures brought to bear by government. The environment has made for a particularly fragile
judiciary that has been denied the freedom to decide matters
"without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements,
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect from any
quarter or for any reason."2 6 It has also bred an unduly deferential and compliant judicial character, ensuring that courts very
rarely act to secure the rights of detainees to challenge the lawfulness of their detention or the conditions to which they are
subject.
c. Advisory Board Review
Through the Advisory Board the ISA offers what appears to
be an alternative form of review,2 62 but Malaysian lawyers have
called the process a "mockery" and "rubber-stamp. '26 3 The Advi261. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra n.230, at Principle 2.
262. See ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 11(1). Section 11(1) provides:
A copy of every order made by the Minister under [S] ection 8 (1) shall as soon
as may be after the making thereof be served on the person to whom it relates,
and every such person shall be entitled to make representations against the
order to an Advisory board.
Id. The establishment of an Advisory Board is mandated by the Federal Constitution.
Article 151 provides:
(b) no citizen shall continue to be detained under [laws or ordinances
promulgated under Section 149] unless an advisory board constituted as mentioned in Clause (2) has considered any representations made by him under
paragraph (a) and made recommendations thereon to the Yang di-Pertauin
Agong within three months of receiving such representations, or within such
longer period as the Yang di-Pertaun Agong may allow.
(2) An advisory board constituted for the purposes of this Article shall consist
of a chairman, who shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and who
shall be or have been, or be qualified to be, ajudge of the Federal Court, the
Court of Appeal or a High Court, or shall before Malaysia Day have been a
judge of the Supreme Court, and two other members who shall be appointed
by the Yang di-Pertaun Agong.
MALAY. CONST., art. 151.
263. See Interview with Cheah Kah Peng & Gooi Hock Seng, lawyers (June 8,
2002). See also Interview with Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, lawyer (June 10, 2002).
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sory Board's mode of establishment and operation compromise
any claim to independence. The Board is, moreover, only empowered to make recommendatory findings and a detainee may
only institute such review once a two-year detention has been
authorized, leaving him without recourse during the first sixty
days of his detention. Although provision is made in the ISA for
representations by the detainee before an Advisory Board,2 6 4 a
number of the ISA detainees refuse to participate in the Advisory
Board review process at all, believing that the process does not
qualify as suitably competent, impartial, and independent review.

26 5

For one thing, while the Constitution requires that the
Chairman of the Advisory Board have attained the level ofjudge,
or be so qualified, no criteria guide the appointment of the two
other members of the Advisory Board.2 66 All three appointments are made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 267 The Yang diPertuan Agong is also empowered to devise the rules by which
representations are brought before the Advisory Board and
those regulating the procedure of the Board. 26 8 Taken together,
these factors fundamentally impair the Board's independence.
Perhaps most importantly, the Advisory Board lacks the
power to issue binding orders. Rather, it merely issues non-binding recommendations to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, who in
turn subsequently gives the Minister such directions pertaining
to the order as he thinks fit.26 9 The merely advisory nature of
the Board's conclusions negates any assessment of the Board's
review proceedings as competent, as required under interna264. ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 1(1).
265. Interview with Wong Luke Khuan and Keng Sun Tao, ex-ISA detainees (June
4, 2002). Both recalled experiences in which the only evidence placed before the
Board was that supplied by the Security Branch.

266.

MALAY.

CONsr., art. 151(2).

267. Id. art. 151(2).
268. ISA, supra n.5, art. 11 (3). Article 11 (3) states: "The Yang di-Pertuan Agong
may make rules as to the manner in which representations may be made under this
section and for regulating the procedure of the Advisory Boards." Id.
269. See ISA, supra n.5, art. 12(2). Article 12(2) states:
Upon considering the recommendations of th Advisory Board under this section the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may give the Minister such directions, if any,
as he shall think fit regarding the order made by the Minister; and every decision of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong thereon shall, subject to [S]ection 13, be
final, and shall not be called into question in any court.
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tional law. This was starkly illustrated most recently in December 2002, when the Advisory Board, in the wake of the Federal
Court's decision in Mohamad Ezam Bin Mohd Nor & Others v.
Ketua Polis Negara,2 ° recommended that the five appellants be
immediately released, taking into account that they had already
served two years detention under their initial detention orders.
To date, neither the Yang di-Pertaun Agong nor the Minister
have responded to these recommendations, far less acted upon
them.271
4. Recommendations
In many legal systems the grant of extensive powers for the
purposes of maintaining public order is offset by the prospect of
judicial review, which can constitute a significant safeguard
against the abuse of these powers. This is not true of Malaysia.
Textual prescriptions of the ISA make judicial review an infrequent occurrence and the government's proposed amendments
look set to make review all but impossible. It is this situation an executive intent on making review of ISA arrest and detentions increasingly meaningless and a judiciary, with rare, courageous exceptions, disinclined to read the provisions to ameliorative effect - that make ISA detainees particularly vulnerable to
abuse.
The delegation believes that recommendations made in Jus2 72
an International Bar Association report
TICE IN JEOPARDY
published in 2000, investigating threats to the independence of
Malaysia's judiciary - should be adopted forthwith. In addition, the delegation recommends that:
1. Information which authorities deem prejudicial to national
interest, if publicly disclosed, should be presented before the
courts in camera. Judges must determine whether such disclosure would indeed prejudice the national interest and order its
public submission before the courts in circumstances in which
they find that disclosure would not be contrary to national interest. In any event, judges must have the benefit of scrutinizing
the information, in normal proceedings or in camera, in order to
allow for judicial review.
270. See supra n.190.
271. See Aliran Media Statement, Scrap the ISA Advisory Board, Jan. 15, 2003.
272. JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: Malaysia 2000, supra n.220.
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2. The right of judicial review should be restored in respect of
decisions made by, or acts of the Minister or Yang di-Pertuan
Agong under the ISA. Section 8B, introduced by a 1988 amendment, should be repealed.
3. Judges should abide by the precedent established in Mohamad
Ezam Bin Mohd Nor & Others v. Ketua Polis Negara that arrest and
detention under Section 73 of the ISA is separate from subsequent detention under Section 8, review of which is not prohibited by the Section 8 judicial ouster.
4. The proposed amendments to the ISA, prescribing that police be freed from the requirement of defending detentions
before courts; that no negative inference should be drawn from
this non-appearance; and that the ISA detainees should be prohibited from divulging details of their interrogations to the
courts, must be entirely abandoned.
5. Members of the government should refrain from speaking
out publicly against members of the judiciary. Conversely, members of the public at large and lawyers especially should be guaranteed the right to provide constructive criticism of the judiciary.
6. Removal or transfer between divisions of judges, particularly
in the wake of their having authored controversial decisions,
must be subject to the review of an independent body, unless
such removals or transfers are publicly explained.
7. The Malaysian government should not only desist from actively compromising the independence of the judiciary, but
should also take greater steps to ensure its independence, as
mandated under domestic and international law. Such measures might include greater educational efforts directed at the
public generally and civil servants in particular. The Malaysian
government should also encourage scholarly exchange between
Malaysian judges and those from other jurisdictions, sponsoring
delegations both to and from other jurisdictions.
8. Laws regulating the composition and procedure of the Advisory Boards must be repealed. All members of the Advisory
Boards shall be, or have been, or be qualified to be, judges of the
Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or High Court. Their findings on representations submitted to them shall be made public
and shall be binding on both the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the
Minister.
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E. Abuse of Detainees
1. Introduction
Amnesty International missions to Malaysia during 1978,
and ten years later in 1988, recorded "[a]n almost uniform pattern in the ill-treatment of ISA detainees, primarily during the
60-day interrogation. ' 973 This pattern continues today, with individual detainees, in part depending on their public profiles, experiencing differing degrees of physical abuse. The controversy
surrounding Anwar Ibrahim's physical mistreatment during his
time under ISA detention may have acted to curtail such manifest abuse. Nevertheless, the dire conditions of detention, the
psychological abuse inflicted during interrogation, and the denial of access to detainees' families remain standard procedure,
and ensure that the experience of detention under the ISA is
almost intolerable.
This section details Malaysia's international and domestic
commitments to safeguarding the well-being of detainees and
protection against torture, cruel, unusual and degrading treatment and punishment. It examines how current practice fails to
conform to these standards: first, in the conditions of detention
detainees must endure; second, in the physical and psychological abuse to which they are subject during interrogation; and
third, in the denial of contact with family during the first sixty
days of detention. This section also documents the extent to
which conditions in the detention camps, although not as extreme as those experienced during the first sixty days, nonetheless fall far short of international standards. Finally, it assesses
the role played by SUHAKAM, the government-sponsored
Human Rights Commission, in monitoring the conditions to
which detainees are subject.
2. Malaysia's Human Rights Commitments
a. International Human Rights Norms
Of the increasing number of human rights standards given
international recognition, few command as much undisputed
consensus as does the prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment. Article 5 of the UNDHR
enumerates this proscription clearly, as does Article 7 of the
273.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT,

supra n.31.

1418

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 26:1345

ICCPR. The ICCPR elevates this right to the status of a nonderogable norm, prohibiting any derogation from its provisions,
even as it acknowledges that in times of public emergency, States

Parties may take measures derogating from their ICCPR obligations "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." 274 The reiteration and amplification of this prohibition in

international instruments such as the CAT, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, and the Body of
Principles, sustain the conclusion that the norm is at the very
core of international customary law and binding on all States,
irrespective of individual ratification .275

The prohibition on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment encompasses both the intentional infliction of physical pain and mental distress. 276 With ap274. ICCPR, supra n.87, art. 4. See also ICCPR General Comment 7, 16th Sess., A/
37/40 94, para.1 (1982) (stating: "The Committee recalls that even in situations of public emergency such as are envisaged by article 4(1) this provision is non-derogable
under [A]rticle 4(2)."). See also ICCPR General Comment 20, Article 7: Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment, 44th Sess., A/47/40 193, para. 3 (1992) (stating: "The Committee also reaffirms
that, even in situations of public emergency such as those referred to in article 4 of the
Covenant, no derogation from the provision of article 7 is allowed and its provisions
must remain in force.").
275. See Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 189-90 (1995)

(stating:
It is now accepted that respect for a number of the rights protected by the
Covenant has become an international obligation by customary law, for all
[S]tates, and such obligations are ergo omnes, obligations to all [S]tates. At a
minimum, 'a [S] tate violates international law, if, as a matter of [S] tate policy
it practices, encourages or condones' any of the following: genocide, slavery or
slave trade; murder or causing the disappearance of a person; torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination; or any consistent pattern of gross violations of other human rights.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT, supra n.81, Sec. 702.
276. See CAT, supra n.162, art. 1. Article 1 states:
[T]he term 'torture' means any act by which severe pain or suffering whether
physical or mental is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.
Id. See also ICCPR, General Comment 20, supra n.275, para. 5. Paragraph 5 states that:
"the prohibition in [A]rticle 7 [referring to the ICCPR] relates not only to acts that
cause physical pain but also to acts that cause mental suffering to the victim."
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preciation for the particularly vulnerable position of persons
placed in detention, the Body of Principles recommends that
"the term 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' should be interpreted so as to extend the widest possible
protection against abuses, whether physical or mental, including
the holding of a detained or imprisoned person in conditions
which deprive him, temporarily or permanently, of the use of
any of his natural senses, such as sight or hearing, or of his
awareness of place and the passing of time. '277 In keeping with
its exhortation that the widest possible protection against these
abuses be extended, the Body of Principles also urges extreme
caution in regard to situations that may prove conducive to the
perpetration of this type of abuse, insisting that it is prohibited
to "take undue advantage of the situation of a detained or imprisoned person for the purpose of compelling him to confess,
to incriminate himself otherwise or to testify against another person." 2 78 A circumstance-sensitive approach is also adopted by
the U.N. Human Rights Committee, urging that assessments of
non-compliance be based not so much on identifying specifically
prohibited forms of treatment or punishment, but on examining
the individual circumstances of the detainee - "[e]ven such a
measure as solitary confinement may, according to the circumstances, and especially when the person is kept incommunicado,
be contrary to this [A]rticle [7]. "279

The Body of Principles elaborates on the type of conditions
that should prevail during detention. These include allowing
detainees the opportunity to be visited by and to correspond
with, their families; 280 to be kept, if possible, in places of deten277. Body of Principles, supra n.120, at Principle 6.
278. Id. at Principle 21(1). See also Principle 21(2): "No detained person while
being interrogated shall be subject to violence, threats or methods of interrogation
which impair his capacity of decision or his judgment." Id.

279. ICCPR, General Comment 7, supra n.2 7 4. See also ICCPR, General Comment
20, supra n.274: "The Committee notes that prolonged solitary confinement of the detained or imprisoned person may amount to acts prohibited by [A]rticle 7." Id.
280. Body of Principles, supra n.120, at Principle 19. See also Standard Minimum

Rules, supra n.124, art. 92. Article 92 states:
An untried prisoner shall be allowed to inform immediately his family of his
detention and shall be given all reasonable facilities for communicating with
his family and friends, and for receiving visits from them, subject only to restrictions and supervision as are necessary in the interests of the administration ofjustice and of the security and good order of the institution.
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tion reasonably near their usual place of residence;2"' to be afforded proper medical care; 28 2 and to obtain reasonable quantities of educational, cultural, and informational material, subject
to reasonable restrictions.2 '3 In order to protect against abuse
and non-compliance with relevant laws, Principle 29 requires
that qualified and experienced individuals who were appointed
by and report to a "competent authority distinct from the authority directly in charge of the administration of the place of
detention," visit places of detention regularly. 28 4 During these
visits, detainees shall have the right to "communicate freely and
in full confidentiality" with such persons.28 5 They, or their counsel, shall also have the right to issue complaints regarding treatment, particularly in circumstances of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment to the responsible administrative
authorities
authorities and "when necessary, to appropriate
286
powers."
remedial
or
vested with reviewing
b. Domestic Obligations
It is surprising, even acknowledging the limited number of fundamental rights enumerated in Malaysia's Constitution, that it
contains no guarantee against torture or other cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment. This failure is itself arguably a violation of the customary law standards just described.
Further, this omission has disturbingly been employed by the
Malaysian Federal Court, in order to distinguish Malaysia from
those countries that have constitutions inscribing such a right,
and accordingly, to imply that treatment deemed abusive in
these jurisdictions would weigh less heavily within the Malaysian
constitutional system.2 87 Nonetheless, the Court does observe
that "one would not expect Parliament to countenance torture
28
or any punishment that is inhuman or degrading."
281. Id. at Principle 20.
282. Id. at Principle 24.
283. Id. at Principle 28.
284. Id. at Principle 29(1).
285. Id. at Principle 29(2).
286. Id. at Principle 33(1). Principle 33(l) states: "In circumstances where neither
the detainee, nor his counsel, can exercise this right, a member of the detainee's family
or other individual with knowledge of the case may exercise the right.").
287. Public Prosecutor v. Lau Kee Hoo, 1983-1 M.LJ. 157.
288. Id.
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3. Problems
a. Detention Conditions
Statements of the KeADILan ten, confirmed by the delegation's interviews with their wives and families,28 9 unfailingly attest
to the deplorable conditions of their first sixty-days of detention.
All were transported, in a manner designed to disorientate
them, to inhabitable cells where each was kept in solitary confinement with no human contact, save for contact with the police officers, who interrogated them. 29 ° Cells were characteristically filthy with grossly inadequate ablution facilities and almost
no ventilation. 29' Beds consisted of slats of wood or slabs of concrete, and no pillows or other bedding were provided, at least
initially. 29 2 Detainees were denied prayer mats, religious reading
material, such as the Koran, and other more general reading material. 29 ' They were also denied the opportunity of exercise and
were often deprived of clothing, footware, and proper nutrition. 29 4 Lights in the cells were always switched on, and detainees were denied access to any means of calculating the passage
of time 295 - measures apparently designed to ensure their disorientation.
Conditions often improved as the period of detention wore
on, but amelioration coupled with threats of return to conditions that previously prevailed 29 6 amounted to coercion and manipulation of the detainees. This appears to be a regular feature
of ISA detentions, employed not only to ensure compliance or
compel incrimination, but in the case of certain categories of
ISA detainees, like "deviant" Shi'ite Muslims, to "turn-around," or
289. See Interviews with wives and supporters of the KeADILan-10 (June 10, 2002).
290. Aff. of Abdul Ghani bin Haroon, supra n.140, at paras. 17 - 27; Aff. of Badrulamin Bin Bahron, supra n.140, at para. 17, 18, 19; Aff. of Lokman Noor, supra n.140, at
paras. 8, 9 & 10; Aff. of Hishamuddin Bin Rais, supra n.140, at paras. 6,7,8; Aff. of
Mohamad Ezam Bin Mohd Nor, supra n.140, at paras. 11, 12, 13; Aff. of Raja Petra Bin
Raja Kamarudin, supra n.140, at paras. 9, 10; Aff. of Tian Chua, supra n.140, at paras. 914; Aff. of Saari Bin Sungib, supra n.140, at paras. 8-12; Affidavir of Badaruddin Bin
Ismail, supra n.140, at paras. 4-7.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Aff. of Badrulamin Bin Bahron, at para. 25.
295. Aft. of Lokman Noor, at para 9.
296. Aft. of Badrulamin Bin Bahron, at para. 20.
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29 7
more euphemistically to "re-educate," these individuals.
Adding to the severity of the treatment to which detainees
are subject, is the restricted access to their families, and the
knowledge that their families, too, are vulnerable to police harassment. 298 When access is permitted, visits take place under observation, 29 and are generally preceded by instructions not to
discuss the conditions of detention with family members.? °
Often, they are permitted to see their families only at the very

end of the sixty-day period, and in some instances, not at all.

This works particular hardship in conditions where the detainee
may fear that no one knows where he is. As he faces the prospect of indefinite detention without trial, he is denied any
knowledge of campaigning efforts undertaken on his behalf,
causing particular mental stress. Testimony to the hardship experienced is the deterioration in health, particularly high blood
3 °1
pressure and weight loss, many detainees suffer in detention. 0
The detainees' experience of detention during the first sixty

days is one of solitary confinement, involving disorientation and
deprivation of the use of natural senses and of awareness of
place and passage of time. Denial of access to family is also customary. These conditions warrant the gravest concern, violating,
as they do, the prohibition on torture, cruel, and inhuman and
degrading treatment.
b. Interrogation Methods

In the earlier years, ISA detainees were routinely subjected
297. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, supra n.31, at 23.
298. Aft. of Saari Bin Sungib, supra n.140, at para. 22: "1 was instructed to discuss
only family matters and to advice my wife and children to stay away from political
programmes and activities." Id. In her discussions with the delegation, AlizaJaffar, wife
of Saari Bin Sungib, recounted her own arrest for having participated in a demonstration outside the Kamunting camp, and disclosed that she thought that she was continuously followed by Special Branch officers. Interviews with wives and supporters of
KeADILan-10 (June 10, 2002).
299. Aff. of Badrulamin Bin Bahron, supra n.140, at paras. 35-36; Aff. of Lokman
Noor, supra n.140, at para. 18. In the case of Lokman Noor, three to four police officers were always present. Id. at para 20.
300. Aft. of Badaruddin Bin Ismail, supra n.140, at para. 13; Aff. of Saari Bin Sungib, supra n.140, at para. 22: "I was made to understand by the Investigating Officer that
future family visits depended on me obeying the warnings that he had given." Id.
301. Aff. of Raja Petra Bin Raja Kamarudin, supra n.140, at para. 12; Aff. of
Lokman Noor, supra n.140, at para. 16; and Aff. of Badrulamin Bin Bahron, supra
n.140, at para. 32.
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to torture during interrogation, or the interrogation was conducted in such a manner that it was itself torture. Wong Luke
Kwan, detained between 1957 and 1963, recalls being "interrogated for six days straight, from October 1 to October 6, nonstop," all the while being deprived of sleep.30 2 Koh Swee Yong,
detained in 1976, recounts being beaten with a rubber hose,
"about one inch in diameter" during his interrogation - "they
would ask me questions and when they weren't satisfied with the
answer, they would beat me." '
Hon Yew Pen, detained from
1971 to 1979, recalls twenty-four hour periods of interrogation,
during which the air-conditioner was adjusted to unbearably
cold temperatures, and being beaten at regular intervals. During
the beatings, interrogators would "wear plastic rings and would
punch your back, not your face. They would put an iron pail on
your head and whack it with a stick. ' 3 4 Physical abuse of ISA
detainees during these years was so intolerable, that at least one
detainee committed suicide.:"
The intensity of abuse appears to have diminished in recent
years, in part because of the international and domestic outcry
surrounding the mistreatment of Anwar Ibrahim, and the disrepute earned by the Malaysian criminal justice system. Nonetheless, physical abuse, intended to degrade and intimidate detainees continues to be inflicted during interrogation. One KeADILan detainee, N. Gobalakrishnan, recounted that during his
detention and interrogation, "Chief Inspector Davadasin assaulted me. He hit and kicked me."30 6 Lokman Noor was forced
to undress and parade before the police officers, showing "both
my biceps in the style of a 'bodybuilder' . . . Sergeant Major
Yusof after that then slapped and kicked me in the right side of
my back. ' 30 7 Threats of severe physical harm also continue to be
part of standard operating procedure and Amnesty International's 1978 assessment remains valid: "All are exposed to the
threat of ill-treatment or torture. The whole interrogation process seeks to induce in the prisoner severe mental and physical
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
krishnan
307.

Interview with Wong Luke Kwan, ex-ISA detainee (June 4, 2002).
Interview with Koh Swee Yong, ex-ISA detainee (June 3, 2002).
Interview with Hon Yew Pen, ex-ISA detainee Uune 4, 2002).
Interview with Chan Beng Sam, ex-ISA detainee (1969-1977) (June 4, 2002).
Interview with Gobalakrishnan a/I Nagappan, supra n.154 (noting that Gobalwas an ex-ISA and KeADILan detainee).
Aff. of Lokman Noor Bin Adam, supsra n.140.
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stress. '' "")SHishamuddin Rais starkly recounts this type of threat
in his affidavit, describing an Interrogating Officer who stood up
during an interrogation and "pointed his hand at me (in the
style as if he was holding a gun in his hand)"'0' and being shown
walls with scratches and boot prints, as police officers described
"the techniques they used until blood was splattered on the interrogation room walls. They threatened me by saying that they
would push detainees forcefully to the wall and beat them until
their blood sprayed onto the walls."3 "
Also unchanged over the years and vividly recalled by generations of detainees is the pathology of the interrogation process:
a chilling interplay of "good" versus "bad" interrogators. Its routine use suggests a procedure designed to maximize the vulnerability of the detainees and exploit this frailty. " ' Together, these
conditions compel an assessment that although mistreatment of
detainees may seldom rise to the level of torture, the standard is
consistently one of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.
In respect of standards of treatment, the delegation believes
it necessary to articulate another point of concern: although we
made various attempts, we ultimately met with very few family
members of detainees alleged to be Islamic militants,3 '1 2 and can
report little as to their conditions of detention. Generally, in
contrast to the KeADILan detainees, these detainees and their
families do not maintain high-profile status within civil society,
and cannot avail themselves of the same organizing and support
networks. Supporters of the KeADILan detainees have made approaches to the families of the "KMM" detainees, but family
members have refused to talk to them as the Special Branch has
instructed them not to do so.3 1 This enhanced vulnerability their absence of profile within established activist circles makes these detainees that much more liable to physical abuse.

308. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra n.31, at 85.
309. Aff. of Hishamudin Rais, supra n.140, at para. 23.1.
310. Aff. of Hishamudin Rais, supra n.140, at para. 23.10.
311. Interview with Nasir Hashim, ex-ISA detainee (June 3, 2002); Interview with
Raja Petra, KeADILan ISA detainee Uune 3, 2002).
312. We did meet with Kelantan Chief Minister, Dato' Nik Aziz (June 6, 2002),
father of alleged KMM member, Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz.
313. Interview with Bahirah Tajul Aris, wife of KeADILan ISA detainee, Mohamad
Ezam Bin Mohd Nor (June 10, 2002).
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c. Conditions in the Detention Camp
Conditions in the Kamunting Detention Camp, where individuals are transferred once detained pursuant to the Minister's
Section 8 order, are markedly better than those they experience
under police lock-up during the first sixty-day detention period.
They nonetheless fail to conform to international human rights
standards. Although the KeADILan detainees are permitted to
meet with their families once a week for forty-five minutes, the
detention camp, Kamunting, is a three to five hourjourney from
Kuala Lumpur, making access unduly onerous for the families
and detainees. 1 4 Recently, arbitrary restrictions have been set
on the kind and number of family members they may meet
with.315
The KeADILan detainees have been subject to particularly
restrictive conditions. In Kamunting, the six detainees have
been separated into three groups of two and not permitted to
interact with other ISA detainees, as is customary for other ISA
detainees.3 16 Very little stimulation is provided and gifts from
families are often arbitrarily denied: all books given them about
Anwar Ibrahim were refused." 7 Wives of the detainees report
that sanitary conditions in the detention camp leave much to be
desired.31 " Recently, drinking and bathing water in the camp
was contaminated with dead birds and maggots. 3 19 In times of
illness and when they embarked on a hunger strike, the detainees have received less than adequate medical attention, and were
often denied treatment at hospitals. 2 ° Family members of the
detainees have requested access to their medical reports, but
have not been granted permission:1
These unduly restrictive and burdensome conditions are
more offensive for the fact that the detention is ostensibly not
punitive in design, but merely preventive. However, the hardship
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. The detainees have no access to televisions or to newspapers.
318. Interviews with Bahirah Tajul Aris, wife of Mohamad Ezam Bin Md Nor; Aliza
Jaffar, wife of Saari Bin Sungib; Zumrah Husni, wife of Dr. Badrulamin Bin Bahron
(June 10, 2002).
319. Interview with Bahirah Tajul Aris, wife of KeADILan ISA detaineie, Mohamad
Ezarn Bin Mohd Nor Uune 10, 2002).
320. Id.
321. Id.
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and discomfort experienced by the detainees often pales alongside the psychological suffering inflicted by denying them knowledge of when, or even if, they will be released, and their belief
that detention may stretch on for years. As Dr. Nasir Hashim
reported to the delegation, it was during this period, and with
the realization of these facts, that some of the detainees "really
'3 2 2
went mad. 1
d. Absence of Remedy
A number of the KeADILan detainees attest to visits from
representatives of SUHAKAM, the Malaysian Human Rights
Commission, during their initial sixty day detention. These visits
are to be welcomed and have the potential to serve as significant
safeguards against possible ill-treatment of detainees.3 2 3 At present, however, the potential is unrealized and SUHAKAM's efficacy is substantially compromised, given that these interviews
often take place in the presence of the very police officers who
conduct the interrogations.' 2 4 In the case of Badrulamin Bin
Bahron ,325 Badaruddin Bin Ismail,3 26 and Lokman Noor,3 27 the
Deputy Director of the Special Branch and head of the operation responsible for the arrest and detention of the ten, was present at their meetings with SUHAKAM.
All detainees were prepared for the meetings in a manner
designed to mislead the SUHAKAM commissioners as to the true
More ominously, detainees
conditions of their detention:.
were instructed as to what they should say to SUHAKAM and
informed that their early release was to be conditioned on satisfactory performance in the interviews. z9 In the case of
322. Interview with Dr Nasir Hashim, ex-ISA detainee (June 3, 2002).
323. As Aliran President, P. Ramakrishnan, explained to the delegation:
"SUHAKAM has the power to walk into any detention center unannounced and examine the conditions and talk to detainees without an officer present." Interview (June
8, 2002).
324. See Aff. of Badrulamin Bin Bahron, supra n.140, at para. 37; Aft. of Badaruddin Bin Ismail, supra n.140, at para. 14; Aff. of Lokman Noor, supra n.140, at para. 21;
and Aft. of Saari bin Sungib, supra n.140, at para. 24.
325. Aff. of Badrulamin Bin Bahron, sapra n.140, at para. 37.
326. Aff. of Badaruddin Bin Ismail, supra n.140, at para. 14.
327. Aff. of Lokman Noor, supra n.140, at para. 21.
328. Aff. of Tian Chua, supra n.140, at para. 28 and Aff. of Saari bin Sungib, supra
n. 140, at para. 24.
329. Aft. of Abdul Ghani Bin Haroon, supra n.140, at para. 51; Aff. of Badrulamin
Bin Bahron, supra n.140, at para. 37: "1 was advise [sic] to use the opportunity to
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Hishamuddin Bin Mohd Rais, a senior police officer informed
him that "we are looking at all aspects of the meeting. If you
give a good impression, then I will give a good report - positive
views about you to the higher authorities for your early release.""" Badrulamin was advised "to use the opportunity in the
meeting to 'please' Dato Razak [Deputy Director of the Special
Branch] . ' 331 Although SUHAKAM representatives would have
been ignorant of these instructions, the circumstances of their
visits - the presence of the police officers, the fact that the meetings were held outside of the detainees' cells - should have
placed them on notice that conditions of detention were deliberately obscured from them. SUHAKAM's meeting with Badaruddin Bin Ismail lasted only ten minutes, during which he was
asked a series of perfunctory questions: whether he had been
physically assaulted, a question which defied an honest answer
given the presence of the Deputy Director of the Special Branch;
whether the food was adequate; and whether he had access to
32
medical treatment.
Now that the affidavits of the KeADILan ten have been
made public and SUHAKAM is privy to the instructions that preceded their visits, it is hoped that they will be more insistent that
meetings take place without the presence of Security Branch officers, that their questioning is more comprehensive, and that
they provide detainees the opportunity to articulate their complaints. Only then will SUHAKAM's potential to act as a significant safeguard against abuse of ISA detainees be more fully realized. 33" The delegation's interviews with SUHAKAM commissioners suggest that while their official position is one which calls
'please' Dato' Razak." Id. Aff. of Chua Tian Chang, supra n.140, at para. 28: "1 was
instructed by my Interrogators thet there were certain things that I was not allowed to
inform to[sic] SUHAKAM." Id.; Aff. of Saari bin Sungib, supra n.14 0 , at para. 24.
330. Aff. of Hishamuddin Bin Md Rais, supra n.140, at para. 28. See also Aft. of
Lokman Noor, supra n.140, at para. 21: "I was advised that the SUHAKAM visit was a test
for me. If I made no complaints, Dato Razak [Deputy Director of the Special Branch]
would decide whether or not to release me." Id.
331. Aff. of Badrulamin Bin Bahron, supra n.140, at para. 37.
332. Aff. of Badaruddin Bin Ismail, supra n.140, at para. 15.
333. Former SUHAKAM commissioner, Tan Sri Anuar Zainal Abidin, explained to
members of the delegation that the government had in fact responded positively to a
number of the Commission's recommendations, observing that the government had
established a committee to review SUHAKAM's report and that it had acted to improve
conditions in Police and Immigration detention facilities, in response to SUHAKAM's
complaints. Interview (June 13, 2002).
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for the repeal of the ISA,3 34 there is surprising equivocation on
the part of the Commission as to how to ameliorate the ISA in
the short term, and a disturbing deference shown the Executive.

Although Deputy Chairman of SUHAKAM, Tan Sri Dato'Harun
Hashim, argued that the Commission was not "fully satisfied that

there is a real security threat to justify the ISA," he nonetheless
insisted that SUHAKAM would not question the grounds of ISA
arrests as "that's security and not our area." '
The Deputy
Chairman also indicated a disturbing equivalence towards the
ISA when he informed the delegation that although SUHAKAM
had submitted recommendations to the government, urging repeal of the ISA, "especially after 9/11 with the U.S.A. making
more atrocious laws than the ISA, we'll allow the government to
33 6
take time to get rid of it.
SUHAKAM's ability to meaningfully check abuses committed against ISA detainees is further compromised by the vulnerable positions of SUHAKAM commissioners themselves. The
terms of their appointment effectively constrain the independence of this body. Recently, when the original two-year terms
of appointment for the commissioners expired, three of the
commissioners failed to be reappointed. Each of these commis334. See Interview with Tan Sri Anuar Zainal Abidin, Former SUHAKAM Commissioner (June 13, 2002); Interview with Zainah Anwar, Suhakam Commissioner and Executive Director of Sisters in Islam (June 12, 2002); Interview with Tan Sri Dato'Harun
Hashim, Deputy Chairman of SUHAKAM Uune 10, 2002).
335. Interview with Tan Sri Dato'Harun Hashim, Deputy President of SUHAKAM
(June 10, 2002).
336. Id. In the weeks prior to publication of the Crowley Report, SUHAKAM released its own report on conditions of detention under the ISA. The report is to be
welcomed and its eighteen recommendations are similar to many made in this Report.
These include recommendations that individuals should not be detained under the ISA
unless genuine reasons exist for believing that such individuals are a threat to national
security; that officers responsible for mistreatment of detainees be subjected to disciplinary procedures; that family members be granted access visits soon after detention; that
detainees be produced before magistrates within twenty-four hours of detention; and
that they be permitted access to counsel from the time preceding their appearance
before magistrates.
However, the report was limited to exposition of detention conditions and failed to
address the more substantive point - whether, in fact, the ISA is a justifiable law. The
report also gave unwarranted emphasis to the testimony of Special Branch Social Intelligence Assistant Director, Anuar Bashah Mohd Sohore, who insisted that interrogations
were carried out without the use of physical force - directly contradicting consistent
testimony of many generations of ISA detainees. See Claudia Theophilus, First 60-Day
Under ISA not 'BrainwashingSession', MALAYSIAKINI, Mar. 6, 2003; Media Statement by
DAP National Chairman Lim Kit Siang in PetalingJaya, Mar. 7, 2003.
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sioners had initiated inquiries critical of the government's conduct - in respect of police mistreatment during the Kesas Highway demonstration and in respect of the situation of indigenous
people in Sarawak. 37 Zainah Anwar, a current SUHAKAM commissioner, explained that the period of appointment should be
extended to safeguard independence and expressed disquiet
over the non-renewals: "Certain commissioners have not been
renewed on SUHAKAM and that certainly is troubling .
[those] who were not renewed were the most proactive." 3 8 The
recent appointment of the former Malaysian Attorney-General
to chair the Commission - a man who, in the past, explicitly
endorsed the ISA - has also raised suspicions that the appointment process is deliberately used to impede the independence
of SUHAKAM. 3 9
Sadly, no meaningful alternatives present themselves to
SUHAKAM's compromised function as a reviewing or remedial
power. The ISA does provide that Ministerial detention orders
shall be reviewed not less often than once every six months by
the Advisory Board, providing for representations from detainees as to their conditions of detention. 40 However, the ineffectiveness of the Advisory Board as a safeguard against abuse of
ISA powers, as documented in the previous section of this Report, means ISA detainees almost never utilize these proceedings. The courts, at least theoretically, present themselves as an
alternative. But, again, as documented in the previous section of
the report, Malaysian courts have seldom exercised review in respect of ISA detentions. This reluctance is compounded in the
context of alleged ill-treatment by an unwillingness on the part
of the courts to recognize that police officers might perpetrate
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and to hold
them accountable for these violations. In a recent case, in which
the appellant alleged that he had been tortured while in police
detention and forced to incriminate himself in order to avoid
more torture, the judge dismissed the allegations as "too far
fetched and implausible to be believed . . . It would indeed be
337. Interview with Yap Swee San and Cynthia Gabriel, executive members of
Suaram (June 2, 2002).
338. Interview with Zainah Anwar, Head of Sisters in Islam and SUHAKAM Commissioner Uune 12, 2002).
339. See Interview with P. Ramakrishnan, Aliran Director (June 8, 2002).
340. See ISA, supra n.5, Sec. 13(1).

1430

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 26:1345

stretching the imagination to even consider the appellant's version, less [sic] to accept it as believable ... Such
transgression by
3 41
the police in our country is unheard of.
4. Recommendations and Conclusions
The first sixty-day period of detention, sealed almost completely from outside view, places ISA detainees in positions in
which they are most vulnerable to torture, cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment. Solitary confinement, deprivation of their
natural senses and disorientation as regards to place and passage
of time, and customary denial of access to family, make the experience particularly severe. In addition, detainees are also subject
to grave psychological abuse and threats of physical abuse during periods of interrogation. Once transferred to the detention
camp, under two-year detention orders, detainees experience
improved conditions. Yet, the prospect of indefinite detention,
of not knowing when or if they will be released, of years of similarly impoverished routine, works unimaginable psychological
hardship. This vulnerability is compounded by the absence of
effective reviewing or remedial power. SUHAKAM, the advisory
boards, and the courts of Malaysia all evidence a disturbing deference to the Executive and a reluctance, despite all evidence to
the contrary, to recognize the abuse perpetrated by police
against detainees during detention.
The delegation recommends:
1. That detainees should not be kept in solitary confinement.
During the first sixty days of detention, detainees should be permitted to interact with people other than their interrogating officers, and during the two-year detention periods all ISA detainees should be permitted to interact with one another. In particular, all ISA detainees should be permitted regular contact with
their families from the very first days of their detention.
2. The Malaysian government should make every effort to ensure that family members of ISA detainees are not subject to harassment by police officers and are not further traumatized.
3. Detainees should be entitled to request the presence of their
counsel during police questioning. Questioning of detainees by
police should be videotaped and these videotapes should be
available on demand to the courts.
341. Mohd Masri bin Radhuan v. PP Perbicaraan Jenayah, 2002-111 M.L.J. 1.
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4. Educational efforts should be directed at police, particularly
members of the Special Branch, as to what type of treatment
constitutes torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
5. All allegations of torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment should be thoroughly and expeditiously investigated,
and be subject to criminal prosecutions. The Malaysian government should make every effort to upgrade detention facilities in police lock-up and in the Kamunting detention camp - to
ensure that conditions in these facilities are consistent with international standards.
6. SUHAKAM meetings with ISA detainees should not be attended by members of the police and detainees should be offered the opportunity to fully articulate their concerns during
these meetings. SUHAKAM visits should be conducted regularly
during the sixty-day detention period, and should include visits
to the places of actual detention. Reports on these meetings and
the condition of the detainee should be expeditiously published
and made available to family and members of the general public.
CONCLUSIONS:

PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

It is our hope that this report contributes to the work of the
many Malaysian NGOs campaigning for repeal of the ISA. However, neither domestic nor international developments bode particularly well for repeal at this current moment. Recent proposed amendments to the ISA indicate that the government is
set to tighten, rather than relax, the ISA's stranglehold; 34 2 and
increased fears of terrorist attacks have substantially reversed the
impetus for reform among the broader public, suggesting that
these proposed amendments are likely to be met with general
deference. Furthermore, the international community, and the
United States in particular, has so softened its criticisms of repressive laws, justified as anti-terrorism measures, that it seems
disingenuous to attempt to distinguish silence from explicit endorsement. Recent high-profile enactments like the U.S. PATRIOT Act increasingly make comparative reference more likely
to support, rather than malign, use of the ISA.
In the next year, Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir
342. See n.153 and accompanying text.
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Mohamad, is scheduled to step down, 43 and is set to be replaced
by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, currently Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Home Affairs, responsible for effecting ISA arrests and detentions. It is possible that Mahathir's departure
may bode well for ISA repeal and ancillary reform: he, in particular, has shown a propensity to employ the ISA and the threat
thereof to shore up his personal political position. 4 4 Abdullah
might initiate ISA reform, so winning favor at home and abroad
and signaling a new post-Mahathir era. Yet, this hoped-for scenario is sadly unlikely. If anything, a post-Mahathir era may compel the government to rely even more heavily on the ISA, in an
attempt to quell the tumult that may follow the departure of this
charismatic leader, popularly perceived as having almost singlehandedly engineered Malaysia's impressive economic growth
and secured relative peace and security.
Another factor limiting the possibility of immediate reform
is the absence of a genuine, deeply-rooted, and wide-ranging
human rights culture, and the concomitant generally permissive
reception afforded human rights infringements in Malaysia.
This is principally a function of State effort. Even senior officials
in SUHAKAM, the National Human Rights Commission, evidence a disturbing relativity regarding human rights, arguing in
respect of the ISA that "especially after 9/11 with the U.S.A.
making more atrocious laws than the ISA, we'll allow the govern'3 45
ment to take time to get rid of it."
Opposition parties also contribute to this permissive environment. Although many of these parties have struggled and
continue to struggle for recognition of human rights and civil
liberties,3 4 6 some of the most significant ones have a less than
stellar record. In particular, PAS' attempts to introduce Hudud
343. Mahathir announced his impending resignation on June 22, 2002. See
MahathirReverses Resignation, BBC, June 22, 2002.
344. See the ISA arrests known as "Operation Lalang," described supra in this Report and the arrests surrounding Anwar Ibrahim's suspension and dismissal, described
supra in this Report.
345. Interview with Tan Sri Dato' Harun Hashim, Deputy President of SUHAKAM
(June 10, 2002).
346. See Interview with Lim Kit Siang, leader of the Opposition Democratic Action
Party ("DAP") (June 12, 2002). Lim Kit Siang has been arrested and detained twice
under the ISA - in 1969 and in 1987. He was also arrested briefly under the Malaysian
Sedition Act, during the delegation's visit to Malaysia, for having distributed a pamphlet
"that dealt with the Islamic State issue and [why] we are worried about the threat." See
also Interview with Wan Azizah, Head of KeADILan (June 12, 2002).
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law in the States of Kelantan and Terengganu - laws prejudicing women and religious minorities particularly 347 - evidence a
political party that can hardly be said to take seriously human
rights for all. Sadly, the imperatives of coalition-building among
the opposition, and the ethically centered nature of politics,
which often generates indifference towards issues principally affecting other ethnic groups, has made for muted criticism from
other parties and an appearance of disregard for human rights.
It is Malaysian civil society - committed NGOs and other
civic associations - that serve as the most genuine inculcators of
human rights culture and promise the best hope for change.
But they are not without their own challenges. Few resources,
restrictive legislation that hampers their operations, a generally
unsympathetic mainstream press, and heightened personal risk
mean that their focus is often necessarily ad-hoc and short-term.
In the context of the ISA, this has resulted in coalitions formed
over the years that "have been basically reactive, coming in the
wake of the ISA's sporadic enforcement with only low-level activism in between." 3
This appears to be true of the most recent
bouts of concerted campaigning undertaken in response to the
arrests and detentions of the KeADILan ten.
The lesser emphasis afforded the recent arrests and detentions of the alleged Islamic militants may reflect a fear on the
part of activists post-September 11 to appear to support terrorism, albeit indirectly. More simply, it might be a consequence of
the fact that individuals targeted by these arrests and detentions,
and their families, are more difficult to contact. They often reside in rural areas and are not part of activist circles. However,
the difference in emphasis also signals that the ethnic/religious
split that characterizes the more formal political arena, infuses
civil society. Activists from secular NGOs who would tradition347. See text accompanying n.67. Further illustration of PAS' intolerance was evidenced last year when several PAS division members submitted resolutions to the National Islamic Affairs Committee, chaired by Mahathir, calling for punitive action to be
taken against several individuals - columnists Farish Noor and Akbar Ali; intellectual,
Kassam Ahmad; academic, Patricia Martinez; lawyer, Malik lmtiaz Sarwar and Sisters in
Islam executive director, Zainah Anwar - for having allegedly insulted Islam, the
Prophet, the Qu'ran, and the ulama (religious leaders). See PAS 'Muktamar'Expected to
Target Writers, NEw STRAITs TIMES, May 29, 2002.
348. See MEREDITH L. WEISS, The Malaysian Human Rights Movement in Social Movements in Malaysia: From Moral Communities to NGO's (Meredith L. Weiss & Saliha
Hassan eds., 2003).
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ally organize and campaign may believe that the issue of these
most recent detentions will be taken up by Islamic NGOs and by
PAS, from whose supporters many of the recent detainees are
believed to be drawn.
As arrests and detentions of these individuals increase, as
they look set to, it is hoped that Islamic NGOs and the more
secularly-orientated groupings seize the opportunity for extraordinary collaboration, allowing more powerful pressure to
be leveled against the government. A possible challenge for this
collaboration is that among the large numbers arrested, some
individuals may raise genuine security concerns - those allegedly connected, for instance, to the Jemaah Islamiyah network.
Unlike the KeADILan arrests, in these circumstances, security
concerns may not so clearly serve as mere pretexts. However, an
anti-ISA collaboration of the type envisaged attains much clearer
focus and sharper definition, by insisting not only that genuine
reasons be given for ISA arrests, but by demanding explanations
from the government as to why, even in cases of valid security
concern, the ISA's detention without trial provisions are justified.
Optimal outcomes for this collaboration would go beyond
more powerful mobilization; collaboration could also encourage
supporters of the diverse groups to trust one another, promote
multi-racial understanding at various levels, and provide the
foundation for collaboration on other issues. 4 9 If ISA repeal
and reform is, not to happen immediately, then, efforts directed
at these goals may, nevertheless, help fuse collaborative campaigns and engender co-operation that lives on beyond realization of repeal and allows for a robust, multi-faceted human
rights culture to take root.
Despite the impassioned rhetoric directed against "Western" human rights activists, and the intolerance shown toward
foreign intervention in Malaysia, principally by the government,
international human rights scholars and activists can help promote this outcome by ensuring that ISA abuses are widely reported abroad and that campaigns and collaboration for its repeal receive due publicity and encouragement.

349. Id.
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ANNEX
ISA-RELATED INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN MALAYSIA
Sunday, June 2, 2002: Kuala Lumpur
TIME
10 A.M.

INTERVIEW
Ms. Cynthia Gabriel, Suaram Executive Director
Mr. Yap Swee Seng, Suaram
Mr. Steven Gan, Editor-in-Chief, Malaysiakini

7 P.M.

Ms. Aegile Fernandez, Tenanganita
Ms. Florida Sundaraswamy
Monday, June 3, 2002: Kuala Lumpur

10 A.M.

Mr. Koh Swee Yong, ex-ISA detainee & Parti Rakyat Malaysia treasurer
Mr. Chong Tong Sin, ex-ISA detainee & Publisher
Mr. Ban Akham, ex-ISA detainee
Mr. Lim Yoon Pang, ex-ISA detainee

11 A.M.

Mr. Ngeow Yin Ngee, Lawyer

2 P.M.

Mr. YB Ramli Ibrahim, KeADILan MP for Kota Bahru

3 P.M.

Mr. G. Rajasekaran, Secretary-General of the Malaysian Trade
Union Congress

3 P.M.

Mr. Raja Petra Kamarudin, ex-ISA detainee and Director, Free
Anwar Campaign
Mr. N. Gobalakrishnan, ex-ISA detainee and KeADILan leader
Mr. Badaruddin Ismail, ex-ISA detainee and Suaram Secretariat
member

8:30 P.M.

Professor P. Ramasamy, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

8 P.M.

Dr. Nasir Hashim, ex-ISA detainee, Chairperson of Socialist Party
of Malaysia
Tuesday, June 4, 2002: Kuala Lumpur

9 A.M.

Delegation observed habeas corpus application of Sejahtul Dursina
a.k.a. Chomel Mohamed.

2 P.M.

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Hon Yen Peng, ex-ISA detainee
Low Ming Leon, ex-ISA deainee
Chan Beng Sam, ex-ISA detainee
Wong Luke Kuan, ex-ISA detainee
Loh Siew Lin, ex-ISA detainee
Tey Boon Chua, ex-ISA detainee
Lim Bok Eng, ex-ISA detainee
Keng San Tau, ex-ISA detainee
Loh Foot Yu, ex-ISA detainee

Wednesday, June 5, 2002: Terengganu
11 A.M.

Mr. YB Abdul Rahman Yusof, KeADILan MP for Kemaman, Terengganu

2 P.M.

Mr. Abdul Hadi Bin Awang, Chief Minister of Terengganu & Acting President of PAS
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Thursday, June 6, 2002: Kelantan
2 P.M.

Nik Aziz, PAS Spiritual Leader & Chief Minister of Kelantan

5 P.M.

Haji Saupi Haji Daud, KeADILan MP for Tanah Merah
Mohammad Mustafa, KeADILan MP for Peringat and chair of
KeADILan in Kelantan
Saturday, .une 8, 2002: Penang

10 A.M.

Mr. P. Ramakrishnan, President of Aliran

11 A.M.

Dato' Dr. Toh Kin Woon, State Assemblyman of Parti Gerakan
Rakyat Malaysia

3 P.M.

Mr. Cheah Kah Peng, Lawyer
Mr. Gooi Hock Seng, Lawyer
Sunday, june 9, 2002: Penang

12 P.M.

ProfessorJohan Saravanamuttu, Universiti Sians Malaysia
Professor Maznah Mohamad, Universiti Sians Malaysia

4 P.M.

Dr. Kumar Devaraj, Central Committee Member of PSM
Monday, June 10, 2002: Kuala LUmpur

10 A.M.

Dato Sri' Harun Hashim, SUHAKAM Vice Chairperson

10 A.M.

Mr. Syed Sharir, National Union of Transport Equipment and Allied Industries'Workers

I1 A.M.

Mr. Leonard Teoh, Lawyer

2 P.M.

Mr. Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, Lawyer

5 P.M.

Meeting with members of the Malaysian Bar Council's Human
Rights Committee
Mr. Christopher Leong
Mr. Malik lmtiaz Sarwar
Mr. Abdul Rashid Ismail
Ms. Harsharan Kaur

8 P.M.

Meeting with wives and supporters of KeADILan Deatainees
Ms. Bahirah Tajul Aris, wife of ISA detainee Mohamed Ezam Nor
Ms. Aliza Jaffar, wife of ISA detainee Saari Sungib
Ms. Zumrah Husni, wife of ISA detainee Badarulamin
Ms. Noor Farahin
Ms. Animah Annette Ferrar
Mr. Khairul Anuar (nickname Jonah)

8:30 P.M.

Mr. Jonson Chong, Lawyer
Tuesday, June 11, 2002: Kuala Lumpur

11 A.M.

Meeting at the American Embassy
Mr. Bob Reiss, U.S. Embassy Official
Mr. Gary Grey, U.S. Embassy Official

1 P.M.

Mr. Karpal Singh, Lawyer/ISA Detainee

2 P.M.

Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, President, International Movement for a
Just World and ex-ISA detainee

2:30 P.M.

Mr. Pawancheek B. Marican, Lawyer
Mr. Christopher Fernando, Lawyer
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Mr Zaid Kamaruddin, Jamaah Islah Malaysia
Dr. Hj Mohamed Hatta bin Hj Shaharom, Jamaah Islah Malaysia
Mr. Sankaran N. Nair, Lawyer
Mr. Sivarasa Rasiah, Lawyer
Wednesday, June 12, 2002: Kuala Lumpur

9 A.M.

Ms. Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, President, KeADILan

11:30 A.M

Mr Said Zahari, commentator and ex-ISA detainee

1 P.M.

Mr Lim Kit Siang, President, Democratic Action Party

3 P.M.
4 P.M.

Ms Zainah Anwar, SUHAKAM Commissioner & Executive Director
of Sisters in Islam
Dr. Syed Husin Ali, President, Parti Rakyat Malaysia

5 P.M.

Mr Zainul Zakaria, Lawyer

7 P.M.

Meeting with Student Activists
Mr. Hasnul Hisham
Mr. Hasmi Hashim
Mr. Amin Shah B. Iskandar
Mr. Farid Hatta
Mr. Rafzan Ramli
Ms. Shazeera Tariq al Ayubie
Thursday, June 13, 2002: Kuala Lumpur

11 A.M.

Tan Sri Anuar Zainal Abidin, ex-SUHAKAM Commissioner

1 P.M.

Dato Sri' Tun Salleh Abas, Former Lord President of the Federal
Court (Interview took place in Terengganu)

3 P.M.

Dr Kua Kia Soong, Suaram Director and ex-ISA detainee

4 P.M.

Dato Dr. S Sothi Rachagan, Regional Director Consumers International
Friday, June 14, 2002: Kuala Lumpur

10 A.M.

Ms. Mehrun Siraj, Ex-Suhakam Commissioner

10 A.M.

Mr Mohamad Azmin Ali, Vice President of KeADIlan

11:30 A.M.

Meeting with Executive Members of the Sahabat Wanita Selangor
(Support Group for Working Women) & the Women's Development Collectives (WDC)
Ms. Maria Chin, Executive Director of the WDC & anti-ISA campaigner
Ms. Chee Heng Leng, ex-ISA detainee

